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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law-State Tuition Payments to Denominational Schools
Are Unconstitutional.-A Vermont statute' required school districts either
to maintain a high school or to furnish secondary instruction at schools
selected by the parents of the pupils. If the second alternative were followed,
the district was authorized to pay tuition to the selected school. 2 Defendant
school district did not maintain a secondary school but made tuition payments
to denominational (Roman Catholic) high schools on behalf of the pupils.
These schools were approved by the state board of education. Religious in-
struction was mandatory only for students of the Roman Catholic faith.
Plaintiff, a resident taxpayer, obtained an injunction against further payments.
The Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed. The payment of tuition to a denom-
inational school by a public entity works a fusion of secular and sectarian
education in violation of the first amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. Swart v. South Burlington School Dist., - Vt. -, 167 A.2d 514 (1961).
Prior to the framing of the Constitution, Thomas Paine wrote:
As to religion, I hold it to be the indispensable duty of government to protect all
conscientious professors thereof, and I know of no other business which govern-
ment has to do therewith.3
The framers of the first amendment accepted the proposition that religion
was a nonpolitical, personal matter and provided that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof . . . . 4 These guarantees became operative on the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.0 Although the "establish-
ment of religion" and "free exercise" clauses are historically distinguishable,
the Supreme Court has used them interchangeably in upholding or striking
down statutes which touch on the delicate area of church-state relations. 7
1. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, § 793 (1958): "(a) Each town district shall maintain a high
school or furnish secondary instruction, as hereinafter provided, for its advanced pupils at
a high school . . . to be selected by the parents . . . of the pupil . . . (b) Each . . .
district shall pay tuition per pupil per school year . . . but not in excess of $325. .. " A
number of other states have substantially similar statutes. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-33
(1958) ; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 41, § 107 (1954) ; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 2678a (1951).
2. In Samson v. Town of Grand Isle, 78 Vt. 383, 63 Atl. 180 (1906), the court
explained the operation of the statute: "[the district] cannot be compelled to select one
course instead of the other, but only to select one course or the other ... " Id. at
391, 63 AUt. at 182.
3. Paine, Representative Selections 41 (Clark ed. 1944).
4. U.S. Const. amend. I.
5. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
6. See O'Neill, Nonpreferential Aid to Religion Is Not an Establishment of Religion, 2
Buffalo L. Rev. 242, 243 (1953).
7. See, e.g., Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952); Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161-67 (1878).
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While it is not possible to formulate any precise test by which the constitu-
tionality of a statute may be judged, it is at least certain that neither the
state nor federal government may participate in the affairs of any religious
organization.s The government must be neutral with regard not only to com-
peting religious sects, but also as between religious belief and disbelief. The
right to free exercise of religion is not absolute but rather it must yield when
the competing interest of the state is greater.10 It is this greater interest
that allows the government to prohibit polygamy although it is the dogma
of an organized church."' The state may compel persons, regardless of religious
objections, to undergo vaccinations,' 2 or it may compel objecting parents to
allow transfusions for their children.: 3
The so-called principle of church-state separation has been subjected to
severe tests in the area of education, especially with regard to the use of pub-
lic funds to aid sectarian institutions. Two propositions are certain: {1) The
state may not directly finance religious instruction;1" and (2) the mere
fact that the expenditure of public funds results in an aid to a religious
institution does not violate the constitutional ban.'3 The court in the instant
case, by narrowing the issue to place the tuition payments within the ambit
of the first proposition,'0 ignored the second. The court based its decision
solely on the rationale that since the Catholic Church was the source of the
schools' support and control, an unconstitutional fusion of public and reigious
education resulted from the tuition payments. The holding of the court was
that these payments were unconstitutional on their face. The court's holding
is incorrect and its reasoning inadequate in light of Cochran v. Louisiana
S. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 73, 85-33 (1944) (correctnecs of religious dogma
not a judicial problem); Watson v. Jones, SO U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1372) (federal courts
have no jurisdiction to adjudicate religious schisms).
9. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). The state may not require
all children to attend public schools. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 263 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
10. For a discusson of the inherently restrictive nature of the first amendment fredoms
generally, see Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905, 903 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 361 US.
91S (1959), 23 Fordham L. Rev. 316 (1960).
11. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1S90); Reynolds v. United States, 93 US. 145
(1378).
12. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 US. 11 (1905).
13. People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 IMI. 61S, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. dcnicd, 344
US. 824 (1952). Religious services involving snake handling may be prohibited. State
v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179, appeal dismissed sub nom. Bunn v. North Carolina,
336 U.S. 942 (1949).
14. People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1943).
15. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 5-S (1947); Cochran v. Louisiana State
Bd. of Educ., 231 U.S. 370, 374-75 (1930); Braddeld v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 297-360
(1399).
16. "Does the payment of tuition to a religious denominational school by a public
entity finance religious instruction, to work a fusion of secular and sectarian education?"
Swart v. South Burlington School Dist., - Vt. at -, 167 A.2d at 520 (1961).
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State Bd. of Educ.17 and Everson v. Board of Educ.,'8 decided by the United
States Supreme Court.
These cases demonstrate that the separation principle is not an absolute one;
that the courts should look to the competing societal values and to whether
the church is the direct or indirect beneficiary of the aid. The Court in
Cochran held constitutional a statute authorizing state supply of nonreligious
texts to denominational schools.
The schools . . . are not the beneficiaries of these appropriations..... The school
children and the state alone are the beneficiaries. 19
The Court pointed out that the interest of the state in the education of its
youth takes precedence over what might be, without that competing value,
a violation of the first amendment.20
In Everson, the Court allowed state-financed bus transportation to children
attending religious schools because of the competing value of child welfare.
In both Cochran and Everson, the Court was careful to point out that the
incidental benefit conferred upon the church schools would not make the aid
unconstitutional.
21
In the principal case, the children, their parents, and the state were the true
beneficiaries of the payments; the payments were not for the purpose of
financing a sectarian institution, but to discharge a duty to provide the children
with suitable education. The court should have considered that the welfare of
the children and the interest of the state in their education was more important
than the indirect benefit which may22 have been conferred upon the sectarian
schools. The failure to take this approach in favor of the dogmatic, simple
one selected, was incorrect. The court assumed to be absolute what the
Supreme Court has declared is not, i.e., that the mere giving of public funds to
an enterprise operated by a religious organization is a support of that religion
and violative of the first amendment. In 1955 a similar problem was presented
to the highest court of New Hampshire. 23 The issue was the constitutionality
17. 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
18. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
19. 281 U.S. at 375.
20. It is interesting to note that counsel for appellant in Cochran anticipated the
Everson holding and indicated that the facts of the present case would give rise to a
conclusion different from the one arrived at: "If the furnishing of text-books . . . is not
considered an aid to . . . private schools . . . the tuition of the children . . . could be paid;
their transportation . . . could be provided. . . ." Id. at 372.
21. Even direct aid in the form of tax relief has been held constitutional. Lundberg v.
County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644, 298 P.2d 1, appeal dismissed sub. nom. Heisey v.
County of Alameda, 352 U.S. 921 (1956). Payment of salaries to nuns teaching In public
schools has also been held constitutional, even where they have taken a vow of poverty.
Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801, 806 (Ky. 1956).
22. There is no indication that the schools would not continue to receive the same
tuition payments without the state aid to the children.
23. Opinion of the Justices, 99 N.H. 519, 113 A.2d 114 (1955). The decision dealt with
the provisions of the state constitution, which are more specific than the first amendment
[Vol. 29
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of a statute giving state aid to denominational hospitals for the education of
nurses. The court found that the payments would be proper.
The purpose of the grant proposed is neither to aid any particular sect or de-
nomination, nor all denominations, but to further the teaching of the science of
nursing.24
Likewise in the present case, the avowed and actual purpose of the aid was
to educate the children. "The fundamental proposition that public moneys shall
be used for a public purpose only has not prevented the use of private institu-
tions as a conduit to accomplish the public objectives."2
The peculiar facts of the instant case suggest that not only were the tuition
payments constitutional, but, what is more, the failure to provide them would
violate the "free exercise" clause of the first amendment. The state assumed
the duty to provide secondary education for children.ya The legislature
recognized the right of the parent to send a child to a school other than a
public school. It could not do otherwise consistently with the fourteenth
amendment.2 7 The state commanded that all children within certain ages
attend school2 The Vermont school district in question provided no public
school facilities. Thus, in effect, the state commanded the children to attend
private schools. Since Catholic children must, according to the dictates of their
religion, 2 9 attend Catholic schools, the court's interpretation of the statute
results in a refusal to them of the aid given to their contemporaries who attend
private nondenominational schools. They are thus economically restrained
from following the dictates of their conscience. By indirection they are forced
to yield their constitutional right3' and to abandon their selected school. The
court justified this result by reference to the metaphorical wall of separation
between church and state. What then becomes of the first amendment prohibi-
tion against preventing the free exercise of religion? A conflict is raised
between what this court considered a violation of church-state separation and
the childrens' right to free exercise of religion. The United States Supreme
Court has never decided whether such a conflict can exist, and if it does, which
principle would take precedence. It is submitted that the primary purpose of
prohibitions. "[N]o money raised by taxation shall ever be granted or applied for the u-a
of the schools or institutions of any religious sect or denomination." N.H. Const. Part
II, art. 83.
24. Opinion of the Justices, supra note 23, at 522, 113 A.2d at 116. The court went on to
say, "If some denomination incidentally derives a benefit through the rlease of other
funds for other uses, this result is immaterial." Ibid.
25. Id. at 523, 113 A.2d at 116.
26. A practical problem is also created by the decision. The court points out that a
1substantial number" of the district children attend the denominational schools. - Vt. at
-, 167 A.2d at 520. They may be unable to continue without state aid. Unlezs other private
accommodations are adequate, these children will be unable to attend secondary school.
27. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
23. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, § 1121 (1953).
29. 2 Sacred Canons, Can. 1374 (Abbo & Hannan 2d rev. ed. 1960).
30. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 533-35 (1925).
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the first amendment is the free exercise of one's religion, and that the
establishment clause was incorporated into the amendment not as an end in itself
but as the principal means of guaranteeing the free exercise. If the means
obstructs the attainment of the end, it must yield. One court has suggested this
answer:
The state is under duty to ignore the child's creed, but not its need. It cannot control
what one child may think, but it can and must do all it can to teach the child how
to think. The state which allows the pupil to subscribe to any religious creed should
not, because of his exercise of this right, proscribe him from benefits common to all.31
Of course, where a public school system is provided, no conflict arises because
of state refusal to give tuition payments to denominational schools. Here the
overbearing expense of maintaining plural systems of education would require
the religious convictions of the Catholic to yield. Where no such compelling
reason is offered, but rather the so-called separation of church and state,
justified as a means of attaining the end of free exercise, results only in
thwarting that end, then the means must yield.
32
The result of the instant decision is that students who choose to attend
nondenominational private schools are given a financial advantage over those
who choose to attend private denominational schools. This is a preference of
the secular over the sectarian. The McCollum33 Court stated that all religions
cannot be preferred over no religion, but the Court in Zorach v. Clauson:'"
recognized the limitations on this principle when it stated that "We cannot
read into the Bill of Rights ...a philosophy of hostility to religion." 35 The
decree of the court in the present case results in precisely such a hostility. It is
suggested that the Constitution does not require a person to be subjected to a
financial burden merely because he has exercised his constitutional right to
obtain his education at a church-operated school. Where the state chooses to
educate its youth by using the facilities of private institutions, it should not be
required to restrict the selection of schools to those that have no religious
connections.
Evidence---Control of Subpoenaed Records Inferred From Witness' Failure
To Deny Control.-Petitioner was subpoenaed to appear and produce certain
records before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Ac-
tivities. He appeared, but did not produce the records. Subsequently, he was
indicted and tried for contempt of Congress.' At his trial, the Government
introduced as proof of the contempt the purpose of the subcommittee's investi-
31. Chance v. Mississippi Text Book Rating Bd., 190 Miss. 453, 467-68, 200 So. 706,
710 (1941).
32. See generally Squires v. City of Augusta, 155 Me. 151, 153 A.2d 80 (1959)
(dissenting opinion).
33. People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
34. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
35. Id. at 315.
1. 52 Stat. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1958).
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gation,2 and portions of the transcript of the subcommittee hearing evidencing
petitioner's unexplained refusal to furnish the requested records of the Civil
Rights Congress. 3 Petitioner offered no contravening evidence, but simply
asserted that the Government had failed to show any connection between him-
self and the Civil Rights Congress or that he actually had possession or control
of the documents in question. He was nevertheless convicted of contempt, and
the conviction was upheld by the federal court of appeals. 4 On certiorari, the
Supreme Court of the United States, four justices dissenting, affirmed. The
Court held that the Government's evidence raised an inference of control and
established a prima facie case which petitioner was then obligated to meet
with refutative evidence. McPhazd v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960).
Inherent in the judicial and legislative branches of the federal government
is the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses for contempt. Although contempt
may be an admixture of both civil and criminal elements,7 a distinction is
usually drawn between the two.s It is considered civil when the punishment is
remedial, intended to compel action favorable to another party,3 and may be
avoided by obedience to the direction of the court.") Contempt is criminal
when the punishment is punitive, used to remove an obstruction to the adminis-
tration of justice" and vindicate the particular body's authority.12  The
power of a federal court to punish for contempt has been narrowed by statute
to instances of misbehavior in the presence of a court or by its officers, or
disobedience of a court mandate.13 This limitation, which has been strictly
2. The investigation was probing the extent of Communist activities in industrial areas
vital to the nation's defense effort. McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 374 (19).
3. The subcommittee had on file a letter of the Civil Rights Congres s the letterhead
of which descrihed petitioner as Executive Secretary and which x-as subscribed with what
was purportedly petitioner's signature. Id. at 374, 377 n.2.
4. McPhaul v. United States, 272 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1959).
5. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 170 (1953); Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co.,
194 U.S. 324, 326 (1904).
6. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 17S, 187 (1957). See Landis, Constitutional
Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 153 (1926).
7. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 41S, 441 (1911).
S. See, e.g., McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 64 (1939); Gompers v. Bucks
Stove & Range Co., supra note 7, 441-46.
9. Imprisonment may be ordered for civil contempt only where a party disoheys an
order to do an affirmative act. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 US. 413, 441-43
(1911). There is no jury trial for civil contempt. United States v. Onan, 190 F2d 1,
9 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. S69 (1951).
10. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., supra note 9, at 442.
11. E.g., In the Matter of Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945); Fareze v. United States, 269
F.2d 312, 315 (1st Cir. 1954).
12. Juneau Spruce Corp. v. International Longshoremen's Union, 131 F. Supp. CO,
873 (D. Hawaii 1955). See also Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 110 (1922).
13. 1S U.S.C. § 401 (1953). See In the Matter of Michael, 326 US. 224, 227 (1945).
As to punishment, see Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 1S (1953); James v. United
States, 275 F.2d 332, 337 (Sth Cir. 1960).
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adhered to by the courts, 14 rests in the particular qualities of the contempt
power, which is said to be beyond the protective reach of the Constitution,
arbitrary in nature, and easily abused.15 Moreover, there is no absolute right
to a trial by jury.16
The power of Congress to punish a contumacious witness for contempt may
be enforced by Congress itself17 or by the federal judiciary pursuant to a
congressional act.' 8 This act exposes to criminal contempt any person who
refuses to answer a pertinent question' 9 or who willfully20 makes default-1 in
producing papers before a congressional committee. When enforced by the
14. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); Matusow v. United States, 229
F.2d 335, 342 (5th Cir. 1956); Cammer v. United States, 223 F.2d 322 (D.D.C. 1955),
rev'd on other grounds, 350 U.S. 399 (1956). But see Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165,
172-73 (1958). Constitutional safeguards, including the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, have been extended by the courts. Green v. United States, supra at
173-79. See also Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 611-12 (1914); Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911). But see James v. United States, 275
F.2d 332, 335 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 989 (1960); United States v. Schlne, 125
F. Supp. 734 (W.D.N.Y. 1954).
15. Green v. United States, supra note 14, at 168-73.
16. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183, 186 (1958); Eilenbecker v. District Court,
134 U.S. 31, 36 (1890). 18 U.S.C. § 3691 (1958) entitles one accused of criminal con-
tempt to a jury trial if "the act or thing done or omitted also constitutes a criminal
offense under any Act of Congress, or under the laws of any state in which it was done
or omitted." Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a) allows summary punishment for criminal contempts
committed within the presence of the court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b) allows trial by the
court on notice for all other such contempts unless a statute expressly grants the right
to trial by jury.
17. Because imprisonment for contempt conviction by Congress could last only as long
as the session of Congress, Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821) (dlc-
tum), the statute was passed "'to inflict a greater punishment than the committee believe
the House possesses the power to inflict.'" Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 207-08
n.45 (1957), citing Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 405 (1856).
18. 52 Stat. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 194 (1958). See United States v. Lamont, 18
F.R.D. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 236 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1956).
19. See United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 153 (3d Cir. 1953); Comment, 29
Fordham L. Rev. 357, 371-73 (1960).
20. To be willful the refusal must be intentional and deliberate. Flaxer v. United States,
358 U.S. 147, 151 (1958); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 165 (1955). Willfulness
as here used does not require an evil purpose, Fields v. United States, 164 F.2d 97, 100
(D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948), as in a statute involving a crime of
moral turpitude, United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 303 U.S. 239, 242-43 (1938). A
specific criminal intent need not be shown. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 251
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
21. Refusal to appear constitutes contempt. International Union of Operating Eng'rs
v. Bryan, 255 S.W.2d 471 (Ky. 1953). The default is "a failure to comply with the sum-
mons." United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 327 (1950). There must be a reasonable
basis for Congress' belief that one is able to comply. United States v. Shelton, 148 F. Supp.
926, 933 (D.D.C. 1957).
judiciary, the individual must be accorded "every right which is guaranteed to
defendants in all other criminal cases."' - This includes proof of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt2 3 and trial by jury.2 1 Although there is no explidt mention
in the statute, the Government does not make out a prima fade case of con-
tempt for failing to produce records without showing the contemnor's control
over the requested documents.2 However, control can be inferred from other
evidence, such as an executive position in the organization whose records are
subpoenaed.2'3
In finding that the Government had satisfied its burden of proof, the instant
Court found sufficient evidence of control solely from the subcommittee's
"reasonable basis" in issuing the subpoena and from the fact that petitioner
had failed to raise the issue of noncontrol before the committee.2 7 Heavy but
seemingly undue emphasis was placed by the Court on its language in United
States v. Bryan.2 8 " Yet, unlike the instant case, no question existed in Bryan
as to whether the witness had control of the subpoenaed documents. She ad-
mittedly had such control.'-9 The main question was whether the Government
was required to show the presence of a committee quorum to establish a prima
facie case of willful default. The Bryan Court answered this in the negative, and
also held that lack of a committee quorum was not an available defense because
the witness had never raised it at the hearing.2° Consequently, that case affords
no authority on the necessity of proving control where that element is clearly
part of the Government's affirmative case.
The dissent took exception to the majority finding of sufficient proof of
control, and argued that there was an improper shifting of the burden of proof
on this issue because the only admissible evidence of control was an inference
from petitioner's unexplained refusal to produce the records. A letterhead of
the Civil Rights Congress over petitioner's name, identifying him as executive
secretary of that organization, was unsuccessfully sought to be introduced as
evidence. It was considered by the trial court, but apparently on the question
of pertinency rather than control.3 Therefore, absence of any independent
22. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 17S, 203 (1957). See the dissQnt of Mr. Ju:tice
Frankfurter in United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950).
23. See, e.g., Bowers v. United States, 202 F.2d 447, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
24. U.S. Const. amend. VI. See Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 163 (1950).
25. N\ilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 3M5, 392 (1957); United States v. Flischman, 339
U.S. 349, 35S-59 (1950). See United States v. Kamp, 102 F. Supp. 757, 759 (D.D.C.
1952). But see the reasoning of London Guarantee & Ace. Co. v. Doyle, 134 Fed. 125,
128 (C.C.E.D. Penn. 1905), rev'd on other grounds, 204 U.S. 599 (1907).
26. Nilva v. United States, supra note 25, at 392-94; Lopiparo v. United Statc, 216
F.2d 87, 91 (Sth Cir. 1954); United States v. Goldstein, 105 F.2d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1-939).
But see United States v. Patterson, 219 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1955).
27. 364 U.S. 372, 379 (1960).
23. 339 U.S. 323 (1950). The Court placed emphasis on the fact that Bryan would
not have produced the records even if a quorum had been present.
29. Id. at 325.
30. Id. at 335.
31. 364 US. 372, 377 n.4 (1960).
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proof by the Government on the element of control was tantamount, reasoned
the dissent, to an overturning of the traditional presumption of innocence ac-
corded a defendant in a criminal case.
The position of the dissent would not appear to be entirely sound, because
it overlooks the fact that petitioner ignored every opportunity to explain to
the committee the reasons for his noncompliance with the subpoena. Respect
for the authority of a congressional committee should have made it incumbent
upon him to do so. A failure to offer any defense should properly be treated as
some evidence that he did enjoy control over the subpoenaed records. How-
ever, since petitioner was on trial for the statutory crime of willful default
and since control was a requisite in the Government's case, petitioner had a
right, as any other defendant, to have the Government establish his guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. It is questionable whether the Government here did so.
While an unexplained refusal may be some evidence of control, it bears more
properly upon the elements of intention and deliberation. There can be no
willfulness if these elements are not present.3 2 Furthermore, it is difficult to
see how there can be a willful default if there are no papers in existence or under
the control of petitioner. It is submitted that the Government should be com-
pelled to produce clear evidence that there actually are papers being withheld.
Unquestioned acceptance by the trial court of a subcommittee's "reasonable
basis" in issuing a subpoena and mere reliance on a witness' unexplained refusal
is not such evidence.
The present case, besides lessening the amount of proof required of the Gov-
ernment in a contempt case, can be viewed in the over-all setting as another
decision 33 where a majority of the Supreme Court has recognized the impor-
tance of the investigatory process and has demonstrated a willingness to sus-
tain convictions of witnesses hampering that process. This is particularly so
when communism, its tenets and subversive manifestations are the subjects of
investigation. It is suggested, however, that whenever contempt of Congress
devolves upon the federal courts, every precaution should be taken to assure
the recalcitrant witness the traditional safeguards and guarantees accorded
any other defendant on trial for violating a criminal statute. That the de-
fendant is a witness before a congressional committee is no reason for any
change.
34
Evidence-Federal Injunction To Enjoin State Officers From Introduc-
ing Wiretap Evidence in State Court Denied.-Petitioner was indicted by
the State of New York for burglary, maiming, assault, and conspiracy. Two
weeks before trial, he sued in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York to enjoin the Bronx District Attorney and other state
officers from introducing at the trial evidence obtained by tapping petitioner's
32. See note 20 supra.
33. See Braden v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 584 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States,
81 Sup. Ct. 567 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), 28 Fordham L.
Rev. 522.
34. United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 380 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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telephone. The basis alleged for relief was that divulgence would constitute a
violation of Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act,1 even though the
tap had been made pursuant to court order in accordance with state law$
The District Attorney did not deny that he had introduced the wiretap evi-
dence before the grand jury, nor that he intended to use such evidence upon
trial. Injunctive relief was denied by the district court.3 The United States
court of appeals affirmed.4 The Supreme Court, in a one sentence memorandum
decision, also affirmed, two justices dissenting. Pugach v. Dollingcr, 81 Sup.
Ct. 650 (1961).
The construction of Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act has
closely paralleled that of federal prohibitions against the use of evidence ob-
tained by an illegal search or seizure.5 Proscription of the latter evidence has
not been extended to state criminal trials0 with the exception that federal
officers have been prohibited from presenting such evidence in a state
court.7 Similarly, although section 605 prohibits admission of wiretap evidence
in a federal court, whether obtained by federals or stateP officers, and although
1. 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (195S), which provides: "[IN]o pr-Lrn not
being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted com-
munication to any person. .. 2' Section 501 of the act, 4S Stat. 110 (1934), as amended,
47 U.S.C. § 501 (1953), makes a violation of § 605 a misdcmeanor. See, eg., 'nited
States v. Gris, 247 F.2d S60 (2d Cir. 1957) (conviction upheld).
2. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 12, provides: "The right of the people to be secure against
unreasonable interception of telephone and telegraph communications shall not be violated,
and ex parte orders or warrants shall issue only upon oath or affirmation that there is
reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained, and identifying
the particular means of communication, and particularly dezcribing the person or perons
whose communications are to be intercepted and the purpose thereof."
3. Pugach v. Sullivan, ISO F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
4. Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1960). Although the permanent in-
junction was denied, a temporary stay pending appeal to the Supreme Court was granted,
with respect to the fruits of the wiretap evidence as well as the evidence itself. Pugach
v. Dollinger, 2S0 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1960).
S. For a chronological development, see Weeks v. United States, 232 US. 333 (1914)
(evidence obtained by federal officers as result of illegal search and seizure inadmLible in
federal court); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 3s5 (19ZO) (indircct
use of such evidence prohibited by fourth amendment; "fruit-of-poisonous tree doctrine");
Elldns v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (federal criteria of unlawful !earch and
seizure applied to state officers to exclude evidence from federal court). See Bradley &
Hogan, Wiretapping: From Nardone to Benanti and Rathbun, 46 Geo. LJ. 413, 430-31
(1958).
6. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (exclusion of evidence obtained by unreason-
able police intrusion not demanded by due process).
7. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
3. Nardone v. United States, 302 US. 379 (1937). See also Nardone v. United State:,
30S U.S. 338, 340 (1939) (derivative use of wiretap evidence pr-escribed by § C05); Weis
v. United States, 30S U.S. 321 (1939) (§ 605 applicable to intrastate as vell as inter-
state communications).
9. Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
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divulgence' ° in any court constitutes a federal crime,1 ' the statute has not
proven a bar to admission of state-gathered wiretap evidence in state courts. 12
In the only previous Supreme Court decision to treat the question, Schwartz
v. Texas,13 the Court found no clear congressional intent to pre-empt state
rules of evidence.' 4 This specious reasoning, exempting state admission of
wiretap evidence from the prohibition of section 605 while holding divulgence
of such evidence a violation in itself, has survived without modification.15
In its disappointingly curt opinion, the instant Court merely cited the
authority of Stefanelli v. Minard' and Schwartz v. Texas.' 7 In the former
decision the Court refused to enjoin the use in a state criminal trial of evidence
alleged to have been illegally seized by state officers. The reason for denying
injunctive relief was a due regard for federal-state relations, i.e., a reluctance
10. Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C.
§ 605 (1958), provides: "[N]o person having received such intercepted communication
or having become acquainted with the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
of the same or any part thereof, knowing that such information was so obtained, shall
divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the
same or any part thereof, or use the same or any information therein contained for his
own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto .... 
11. 48 Stat. 1100 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 501 (1958).
12. Many states admit wiretap evidence; some authorize limited law-enforcement wire-
tapping by statute. E.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:322 (West 1951); Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 272, § 99 (Supp. 1959); N.Y. Const. art. I, § 12; N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-a;
see Hearings on Wiretapping, Eavesdropping, and the Bill of Rights Before a Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 App., at 35-39 (1958) ;
Hennings, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Legislator's View, 44 Minn. L.
Rev. 813, 817 (1960). See also Rosenzweig, The Law of Wiretapping, 32 Cornell L.Q.
514, 525-27 (1947); Westin, The Wiretapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative
Proposal, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 165, 181-86 (1952).
13. 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
14. "[Tlhe introduction of the intercepted communications would itself be a violation
of the statute, but in the absence of an expression by Congress, this is simply an addi-
tional factor for a state to consider in formulating a rule of evidence for use in its own
courts." Id. at 201. See Savarese, Eavesdropping and the Law, 46 A.B.A.J. 263, 334-36
(1960).
15. The state rule of evidence doctrine enunciated in Schwartz was not directly ques-
tioned by the Court in Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 92, 101 (1957), nor had Its
validity been otherwise reviewed by the Court prior to the instant appeal. See People v.
Variano, 5 N.Y.2d 391, 157 N.E.2d 857, 185 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1959); People v. Dinan, 7 App.
Div. 2d 119, 181 N.Y.S.2d 122 (2d Dep't 1958), aff'd mem., 6 N.Y.2d 715, 158 N.E.2d
501, 185 N.Y.S.2d 806, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 839 (1959); Commonwealth v. Voci, 393 Pa.
404, 143 A.2d 652, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 885 (1958). Cf. Savarese, Eavesdropping and
the Law, supra note 14. State admission of wiretap evidence is based on the common
law rule that evidence illegally obtained is admissible if relevant. See 8 Wlgmore, Evidence
§§ 2183-84b (3d ed. 1940). Compare People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert.
denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926), with In re Tel. Communications, 9 Misc. 2d 121, 170
N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
16. 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
17. 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
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by the Court to intervene piecemeal in a state's administration of its criminal
law.'5 Specifically, the restraint doctrine was invoked on the ground that
federal intrusion would have involved resolution of the collateral issue of
an alleged violation of due process. In effect, the Court would have been
compelled to interrupt a state criminal proceeding in order to measure the
conduct of state officers against the undefined criteria of procedural due process:
If we were to sanction this intervention, we would expose every State criminal pros-
ecution to insupportable disruption. Every question of procedural due proces3 of
law-Nith its far-flung and undefined range-would invite a flanking movement
against the system of State courts by resort to the federal forum .... 10
However, the restraint doctrine did not prevent the federal judiciary from
enforcing federal law via injunction in barring a federal officer from introduc-
ing illegally seized evidence in a state criminal trial.- 3 It would appear, there-
fore, that where federal law has provided a clear and definite standard of
conduct for law enforcement officers owing obedience to that law, the Slcfancl i
doctrine would not militate against federal intervention in state prosecutions
to insure compliance with that law. Considered in that posture, the present suit
did not necessitate federal determination of a collateral issue. The Court's
construction of section 605 has certainly been unambiguous.2 Both federal
and state officers are prohibited from using wiretap evidence. The propriety
of federal action to enforce that prohibition, prior to the instant case, appeared
unaffected by the restraint doctrine. Nevertheless, the Court's extension of that
policy to bar injunctive relief in the present case has rendered federal equity
even more inaccessible as a discretionary remedy to protect federal rights
threatened in state proceedings.
Moreover, even though considerations of federal restraint be proper in a
particular case, SteJanelli clearly accepted the traditional rule that federal
equity might grant relief where irreparable injury would otherwise ensue$2
This requisite certainly existed in the instant case. Neither remedy by way
of damages2 3 nor vindication through federal prosecution - have proven ade-
18. The policy of federal restraint evoked in Stefanelli is a derivative of the general
rule that federal equitable power will not be exercised to restrain in toto state pro:wzcu-
tions based on state laws suspected to be unconstitutional. See Douglas v. City of Jean-
nette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 -U.S. 45, 49 (1941);
Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 2S5 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1935). But see Rca v. United
States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956) (federal officer restrained from turning over to state officers
evidence illegally obtained).
19. 342 U.S. at 123.
20. Rea v. United States, 350 US. 214 (1956). But sea Vod v. Storb, 235 F2d 4S, 49
(3d Cir. 1956).
21. "Section 605 contains an express, absolute prohibition against the divulgence of
intercepted communications." Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 92, 102 (1957).
22. 342 U.S. at 122. See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 US. 157, 163 (1943).
23. Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1947) (dictum) (§ C0S create3
a private right to civil action). See Restatement, Torts § 2S6 (1933).
24. 43 StaL 1100 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 501 (195S).
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quate in the light of experience,25 and alternative relief by way of appeal is
illusory, especially in view of the Court's reaffirmation of Schwartz.20 On the
other hand, the Court in Stefanelli did state that a conviction would not
constitute irreparable harm.2 7 That conclusion rested on the Court's adher-
ence to the rule of Wolf v. Colorado28 that introduction of illegally seized
evidence did not, in fact, violate due process. In the instant case, the Court,
in relying on Schwartz, may well have been applying the same rationale in
that admission of wiretap evidence does not violate federal law so as to
invalidate a subsequent conviction. But, unlike Wolf, the divulgence of wiretap
evidence in a state court does violate federal law. The circumstance that
admission of such evidence does not warrant reversal does not exempt the
divulgence from the prohibition of section 605. On the contrary, it points up
the impossibility of remedying petitioner's injury once the criminally offered
evidence is admitted.29  In view of these considerations, the present Court's
unattended reference to Stefanelli would indicate an amplification of the
restraint doctrine to preclude collateral intervention by federal equity on any
grounds in state criminal proceedings, without regard to the danger of irre-
parable injury.
The Court's reliance on Schwartz appears wholly unnecessary to this de-
cision.30 That case was not concerned with the propriety of federal inter-
25. There have been no prosecutions of law-enforcement officers under § 501, and
only one successful prosecution in any instance. See United States v. Gris, 247 F.2d 860
(2d Cir. 1957) ; Savarese, Eavesdropping and the Law, supra note 14, at 266.
26. A state conviction based on wiretap evidence will not be reversed under federal law,
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), or New York law, People v. Variano, 5 N.Y.2d 391,
157 N.E.2d 857, 185 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1959).
27. 342 U.S. at 122.
28. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
29. "If the federal question is not now protected, it can never become the basis for
relief." Pugach v. Dollinger, 81 Sup. Ct. at 652 (Douglas, J., dissenting). With respect
to petitioner's right to equitable relief under § 605, the construction of that section in
Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937), indicated that the individual's right
of privacy was the gravamen of the congressional intent manifested in the statute. The
language of the Court condemning wiretapping as "inconsistent with ethical standards
and destructive of personal liberty," points up that individual rights created by § 605
are of a more serious nature than a mere right to a civil action in tort. The Court con-
tinued: "The same considerations may well have moved the Congress to adopt § 605
as evoked the guaranty against practices and procedures violative of privacy, embodied
in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution." Ibid. This language was
adopted by the Court in Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 92, 103 (1957).
The language in Nardone v. United States, supra, shows that § 605 might well have been
termed an "Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens," within the meaning
of the Civil Rights Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1958), which gave district courts original
jurisdiction in a civil action by any person "to redress the deprivation, under color of any
State law . . . of any right, privilege or immunity secured . . . by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens. . . ." But see McGuire v. Amrein, 101 F. Supp. 414
(D. Md. 1951) (jurisdiction under Civil Rights Act denied on facts similar to Pugach).
30. Mr. Justice Brennan based his concurring opinion solely upon the authority of
Stefanelli and refused to join the majority in its reliance upon Schwartz.
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vention to prohibit criminal divulgence of wiretap evidence. The sole considera-
tion there was the propriety of admitting such evidence in a state court.
Obviously, the present Court, in citing Sclra,artz, intended no more than a
reaffirmation of the state's right to formulate its own rules of evidence with
respect to wiretapping. Curiously and conspicuously absent in this regard is
any reference to Benanti v. United States,31 where the Court denounced New
York's system of law enforcement wiretapping as illegal and violative of
section 605.32 The present decision appears totally inconsistent with the
implications in Benanti regarding federal supremacy.33 By virtue of the
supremacy clause there is imposed upon the state judiciary an obligation no
less compelling than the duty of the federal judiciary to effectuate, and not
frustrate, applicable federal law. The instant decision, in effect, grants a
license to state officers to use wiretap evidence, but exposes them to the risk
of federal prosecution for doing so.
The Court has not clarified the problems of wiretapping. It has compounded
them. Furthermore, the absence of any mention of the pre-emptive scope of
section 605, enunciated in Benanti, appears to signal a reversal in trend and
a new policy of federal tolerance toward continued police wiretapping. The
practical effect on persons threatened in state proceedings with the criminal
use of wiretap evidence is complete federal foreclosure of relief, either by way
of appeal from the conviction or by application for injunction, the only possible
alternatives.34
In Olmstead v. United States,3 in a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court
held that wiretapping was not properly a search or seizure within the meaning
of the fourth amendment. A less technical appraisal of the purpose of the
amendment, however, would certainly indicate that the spirit of its provisions
31. 355 U.S. 92 (1957).
32. Id. at 105-06: "We find that Congress, setting out a prohibition in plain terms, did
not mean to allow state legislation which would contradict that vectlon and that policy."
The Court cited Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (Pennsylvania law against
subversion held invalid because of congressional pre-emption). Compare discuzzlon in People
v. Broady, 5 N.Y.2d 500, 153 N.E.2d 817, 136 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1959). See Savaree, Eaves-
dropping and the Law, 46 A.B.AJ. 263, 334-36 (1960).
A related problem, whether both an interception and a divulgence are required to
constitute a violation of § 605, was reserved by the Court in Benanti, 355 US. 92, 10
n.5 (1957). Actually this point was rendered moot by the second Nardone derion, 303
U.S. 338 (1939), since it is impossible to conceive of a situation where a law-enforcament
agency would not make some use of the wiretap evidence at least indirectly and thereby
violate the statute. See Donnelly, Comments and Caveats on the Wiretapping Controversy,
63 Yale LJ. 799, 801-02 (1954).
33. 355 US. at 105-06.
34. People v. Dinan, 7 App. Div. 2d 119, 131 N.Y.S.2d 122 (2d Dep't 1953), ai'fd
mem., 6 N.Y.2d 715, 153 N.E.2d 501, 135 N.Y.S.2d S06, cert denied, 361 US. 339 (1959).
See United States ex rel. Graziano v. McMann, 275 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1910) (writ of
habeas corpus on ground that state-obtained wiretap evidence had been admitted at Etate
trial denied). Judge Medina expressed reluctance in having to acquiece in the Schwartz
doctrine. Id. at 286 (concurring opinion).
35. 277 US. 438, 464-65 (1923).
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had been violated, if not its strict denotation. 3  This constitutional question
has unfortunately never been reconsidered by the Court.37 The Court has,
however, used section 605 to secure this protection of the right of privacy,08
despite sporadic doubts as to its precise scope.3 0 The present retirement of the
federal judiciary from control over state wiretapping indicates that the Court
has now conceded this area to the Congress. In view of past legislative inertia
with respect to amending section 605,40 however, the probable result would
appear to be continued federal acquiescence in the state practice of obtaining
evidence by wiretapping. However, the confusion and inconsistency perpetuated
by the instant decision make it imperative that Congress clearly and unequiv-
ocally define the duty of the state judiciary in relation to the federal ban on
use of wiretap evidence.
In this regard, there do exist certain areas, such as national security, which
suggest the exigency of striking a proper balance between the individual's
right to privacy and the necessity of meeting major crimes by the most
expeditious means. Solution of this problem must of its nature be accomplished
by specific legislation. In order to maintain adequate protection of individual
privacy, modification of section 605 to authorize limited law-enforcement wire-
tapping in these areas should provide a procedure analogous to the fourth
amendment search warrant. Appropriate judicial authority would thereby
be interposed to safeguard individual privacy of communication from the danger
of arbitrary police activity. In addition, to guarantee uniformity of protection,
any legislation aimed at liberalizing section 605 should be applied to federal
as well as state law enforcement agencies, consonant with their respective
spheres of activity.
Grand Jury-Report Censuring Noncriminal Misconduct of Public Offi-
cials Unauthorized.-A Schenectady County grand jury investigated charges
against the county highway department, without discovering any evidence on
36. "Clauses of the Constitution guaranteeing to the individual protection against
specific abuses of power, must have a . . . capacity of adaptation to a changing world."
Id. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
37. See generally Bradley & Hogan, Wiretapping from Nardone to Benanti and
Rathbun, supra note 5. See Pugach v. Dollinger, 81 Sup. Ct. 650 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
38. See Bradley & Hogan, Wiretapping from Nardone to Benanti and Rathbun, supra
note 5.
39. E.g., Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957) (use of existing telephone
extension with receiver's permission not prohibited by § 605); Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129, 133 (1942) (dictum) (protection of § 605 is of the means of communication,
not secrecy of conversation); Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942). See gen-
erally Brownell, The Public Security and Wiretapping, 39 Cornell L.Q. 195 (1954).
40. See Hearings on Wiretapping, Eavesdropping, and the Bill of Rights Before a Sub-
committee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Se s., pt. 4, at
781-1031 (1959). See Keating-Celler bill to exempt state procedure of limited law enforce-
ment wiretapping from the provisions of § 605, S.3340, H.R. 11589, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 3561 (1960).
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which to base a criminal indictment. In lieu thereof, it sought to file a report of
its findings criticizing department practices as contrary to public interest.1 The
impaneling court, to which the report was returned, accepted it for filing but
ordered the contents sealed except for a minor portion.2 The foreman of the
panel thereupon instituted an Article 7S3 proceeding to compel publication of
the report. This petition was dismissed by the appellate division;4 and the
court of appeals, because of the importance of the question in the administra-
tion of justice, granted leave to appeal. The court affirmed the actions of the
lower courts, dividing four-to-three. 5 Since the common law powers of the grand
jury have been supplanted by the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, and
no such power is conferred on the grand jury by constitutional provision or
statute, there is no authority for the grand jury to make a report censuring
public officials for noncriminal misconduct. Wood v. Hughes, 8 N.Y.2d 709,
N.E.2d , N.Y.S.2d - (1961).
At the common law, the grand jury traditionally performed a dual function,
one judicial and the other quasi-administrative. Its judicial function was to
inquire into the commission of all crimes triable within the county, to indict
and present for trial those persons believed guilty of crime, and to protect
innocent persons from unwarranted prosecution.0 The innocent were further
1. The grand jury report, sometimes called a presentmnt, is a written statement to
the impaneling court concerning matters discovered during the course of a grand jury
investigation. The instant court distinguished between the prezentment and the report,
defining a presentment as a criminal accusation made at the grand jury's instance, fimilar
in nature to the indictment of a public prosecutor, and a repurt as a moral accusation
without any forum being provided for explanation or defense. Wood v. Hughee, 3 N.Y2d
709 n.1, - N.E.2d - n.1, - N.Y.S.2d - n.1 (1961). The distinction between the nov.'
obsolete form of presentment and the present-day report does not lie in its hking ezen-
tially a moral accusation, although some reports filed in the past have been guilty of
this abuse. The report is rather, as outlined above, a statement covering matter, inves-
tigated by the panel which are sufficiently important to the community to warrant public
attention. Its primary purpose is not to accuse but to focus public attention on matters
requiring remedial action. It may accuse and censure incidentally, but that is not its
purpose, and such evils, if they be considered such, may be regulated by expunging or
sealing the objectionable matter prior to filing as a public record. See Kuh, The Grand
Jury 'Presentment": Foul Blow or Fair Play?, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 1103 (1955). See also
In the Matter of Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, $9 A.2d 416
(1952).
2. In the Matter of May 1959 Grand Jury, 22 Misc. 2d 95S, 196 N.YS2d 10 (Sup. Ct.
1959). That portion of the report which the court made public had to do with the con-
dition of windows in the county jail.
3. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1233-1306 authorize a special proceeding for the reviewv of
discretionary acts by public officers, in this instance a justice of the supreme court. Or-
dinarily the petition is made in the supreme court, but where, as here, the proceeding
is against a justice of that court, the proper forum is the appellate division. N.Y. Civ.
Prac. Act § 12S7.
4. Wood v. Hughes, 11 App. Div. 2d S93, 203 N.Y S.2d 4C0 (3d Dep't 1960).
5. Judge Fuld wrote the majority opinion. Separate dissenting opinions were vritten
by Chief Judge Desmond and Judge Froessel, in both of which Judge Burke concurred.
6. Kuh, supra note 1, at 1105-06.
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protected in their reputation by a requirement of strict secrecy as to grand
jury proceedings. 7 Its quasi-administrative function was to inquire into and
report upon matters of public concern, especially misconduct of public officials. 8
In America, the grand jury is a creature of statute in practically every
state, and in New York it is regulated by the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. 9 Prior to the instant decision, it had been a matter of practice for
grand juries acting under the code to exercise this quasi-administrative func-
tion along with their judicial function. Commanded by statute to inquire into
the wilful and corrupt misconduct of public officials,' 0 New York grand juries
would indict the guilty parties where their investigations uncovered criminal
misconduct, and, where such misconduct was not criminal but warranted public
knowledge, would focus attention upon it by means of a report or presentment
embodying their findings.
The legality of the report, however, has been disputed since the turn of the
century, and the lower courts of New York have been in conflict up to the
present time." The conflict has not been confined to New York, though the
number of states presently allowing the report are a dwindling minority."'
The dispute in New York was engendered by doubt as to whether the common
law grand jury function of reporting had been continued because not explicitly
abrogated by subsequent constitutional or statutory provisions, or whether it
had been abrogated because not explicitly authorized by such provisions. The
legislature in effect was silent on this point.
Jones v. People13 considered the question of whether the statute authorizing
inquiry into misconduct of public officials was also an implicit grant of the
power to report. Here, the only appellate authority in New York to touch upon
7. Kaufman, The Grand Jury-Its Role and Its Powers, 17 F.R.D. 331, 333 (1955).
8. For an excellent discussion of the general function of the common law grand jury,
see 10 Holdsworth, A History of English Law 146-51 (1938). See also Kuh, supra note 1;
Note, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 590 (1961).
9. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 223-60. For a current compilation of statutes, see Com-
ment, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 152 (1960), which sets forth statutes dealing with inquisitorial
powers.
10. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 253(2).
11. Leading New York decisions allowing the report censuring public officials include
Jones v. People, 101 App. Div. 55, 92 N.Y. Supp. 275 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 181
N.Y. 389, 74 N.E. 226 (1905); In the Matter of Quinn, 5 Misc. 2d 466, 166 N.Y.S.2d 418
(Ct. Gen. Sess. 1957). Contra, dissent of Justice Woodward in Jones v. People, supra
at 59, 92 N.Y. Supp. at 277; In the Matter of Wilcox, 153 Misc. 761, 276 N.Y. Supp. 117
(Sup. Ct. 1934); Matter of Osborne, 68 Misc. 597, 125 N.Y. Supp. 313 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
12. California and Florida still permit the report by case law. See Irwin v. Murphy,
129 Cal. App. 713, 19 P.2d 292 (Dist. Ct. App. 1933); Ryon v. Shaw, 77 So. 2d 455 (Fla.
1955). New Jersey has recently modified its rule so that reports may not be used to
rebuke individuals in the absence of conclusive proof of wrongdoing. In the Matter of Pre-
sentment by Camden County Grand Jury, - N.J. -, - A.2d - (1961). For states which
prohibit the report by decisional law, see Comment, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 152, 157 n.45
(1960).
13. 101 App. Div. 55, 92 N.Y. Supp. 275 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 181 N.Y. 389,
74 N.E. 226 (1905).
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the subject for a period of over fifty years, held, by a divided court, that the
statute was implicit authority for the report. In In the Matter of Quinn1,
another basis was relied upon, i.e., the allegedly unaltered common law as con-
tinued in force by the New York State Constitution.' 5 Quinn attempted to
resolve the doubt in favor of preservation of the common law grand jury
reportorial function. The court found no express abrogation of that power by
the legislature. The court of appeals, however, in passing upon the question
for the first time in the instant case, reached the opposite conclusion on both
arguments. Section 253 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure doe not au-
thorize explicitly or implicitly the grand jury report, nor does the constitutional
provision adopted in 1938.11 The majority further found that any common
law function which might have been continued by the original constitution had
been supplanted by the enactment of the original Code of Criminal Procedure
in 1849, which was silent as to the reportorial powers of the grand jury. The
effect of the majority ruling is to deny this quasi-administrative function to
our present-day grand jury.
The soundness and propriety of both the majority and dissenting opinions
are points upon which reasonable men may disagee. However, the submission
of a controversy to a court must necessarily result in a decision one way or the
other, and it is for those who would change the rule to resort to the legislature.
Analysis of the majority and both dissenting opinions reveals that all three
accepted the same major premise, i.e., if the present grand jury has the power to
report, it must be derived from the unaltered common law continued in force
by the constitution, from the constitution itself, or from statute. It is in their
minor premises and proof that the opinions differ and logically reach opposite
conclusions.
The majority's first minor premise is that whatever powers the grand jury
derived from the common law were supplanted, and those not conferred were
abrogated by the enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the majority's
opinion, the detail and comprehensiveness of that act, together with the avowed
purpose of the Commissioners on Practice and Pleading on the Code of Criminal
Procedure to supply "a clear and well understood definition of [the grand
jury's] powers,' 7 amounted to an abrogation by silence of the common law
14. 5 Misc. 2d 466, 166 N.TY.S.2d 413 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1957).
15. Id. at 463-70, 166 N.Y.S.2d at 420-22.
16. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6.
17. S N.Y.2d at -, - N.E.2d at X-, - .Y.S.2d at -. The majority cited the Fourth
Report of New York Commissioners on Practice & Pleading 115-29 (149), as authority
for its argument that the legilature intended in 1349 to abrogate any reportorial function
of the grand jury. A reading of this report, however, reveals that nowhere was there any
actual discussion of this function. It appears that the majority has quoted out of conteut
and in so doing has distorted the meaning of the commissioners. When the remarls quoted
by the majority are read in context, it is dear that they refer only to the then vague
status of the law as regards criminal prosecution by indictment and not to any quasi-
administrative function of reporting on matters of public concern. It is significant to
note also that no comment w.as made by the commssioners on § 277(3), %:hich is the
present N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 253(2).
1961]
FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW
power to report. On the other hand, Chief Judge Desmond, in his dissent,
failed to find such an abrogation, insisting that "in the absence of a clear con-
stitutional or legislative expression, the grand jury's powers may not be cur-
tailed."' 8 It seems that on this point Judge Desmond's argument exposes a
fallacy in the majority's argument in as much as an abrogation by silence falls
far short of a clear legislative expression of curtailment.
The majority's next two arguments are based on the assumption of the
validity of its first, and, consequently, those who would accept them must make
a similar assumption. Those arguments run: the common law basis for the
power to report having terminated, the power must be found to exist either in
(1) the constitution, or (2) statute. Since it can be found in neither of these,
there is no power to report. The grand jury's function is limited to indictment,
and when it cannot do this, its function ceases.
In order to establish these two arguments, it was necessary for the majority
to clear away the obstacles placed in its path by the decision and reasoning of
the Jones case. For the Jones decision established that the statutory command
to inquire into the wilful and corrupt misconduct of public officials was also
an implicit authorization to render the report. The rationale of the Jones
court was that official inquiry tends to official action, and the grand jury, not
being clothed with executive authority, can only report. The Jones rationale
is equally applicable to the subsequently adopted constitutional provisions
guaranteeing that the right to inquire into wilful and corrupt misconduct of
public officials shall never be impaired. 19 The majority in the instant case
dispensed with the Jones decision by a statutory construction of sections 245
and 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which seems somewhat strained and
less than satisfactory, even assuming that the common law function of the
report had been abrogated. The "wilful and corrupt misconduct" which is the
subject of inquiry is limited to criminal acts only. Section 253 is reduced to a
mere clarification by enumeration of the command of section 245 to inquire
into all crimes triable within the county, and not, as both dissents argue, a
separate mandate to inquire into wilful and corrupt misconduct whether criminal
or not.20 For the majority, the acts of public officials made criminal by sections
18. 8 N.Y.2d at -, - N.E.2d at -, - N.Y.S.2d at -.
19. The majority, in reaching its conclusion that N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6, does not
contain an implicit grant of power to report, referred to the discussion of § 6 during
the hearings of the Constitutional Convention of 1938. 3 Revised Record of the Con-
stitutional Convention of the State of New York 2570-73 (1938). This position would
be valid if one assumed that the common law function of reporting had been abrogated
by prior legislation. But if, as contended by the dissent, the common law power remained
unaltered, then the majority's argument becomes at best equivocal. For, as delegate Halpern
stated, the constitutional provision was drafted "very carefully to avoid the question ... "
Id. at 2573. While the majority may be correct in saying that this provision alone does
not authorize the report, the dissenting view, that the common law plus this provision
affords a constitutional basis for the report, appears equally arguable.
20. The majority further argued, by way of a reductio ad absurdum, that if § 253,
authorizing inquiry into official misconduct, is an implicit grant of the power to report,
then § 245, authorizing inquiry into all crimes, is also an implicit grant of power to report
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1320-7S of the Penal Law constitute an all-inclusive list of acts which amount
to "wilful and corrupt misconduct," 21 and the concept of "wilful and corrupt
official misconduct which does not amount to crime is self-contradictory and
meaningless." 22
Chief Judge Desmond and Judge Froessel in their separate dissents argued
on the other hand that the common law function to inquire and report on offi-
cial misconduct had been preserved and maintained by the statute. While
judge Desmond based his view on the legislative history23 and decisional law,
Judge Froessel came to grips with the statutory construction indulged in by
the majority. In his view, section 253 is rendered meaningless unless it serves
some purpose other than section 245. That purpose must be to continue to
authorize the grand jury to investigate such matters and report thereon for the
public information after its inquiry.
It is not necessary to consider the policy arguments for and against the
report, as they have been treated at length elsewhere.2-1 In the last analysis, they
remain policy arguments. The narrow question which the court has answered
is whether the grand jury has the power to report, and not should it have that
power. However, by thus answering this question, the larger issue of whether
New York grand juries should be endowed with and exercise the reportorial
power has, in effect, also been determined. Yet, this is a political question which
logically ought to be determined by legislative expression after due considera-
tion of the public interests. On the other hand, the instant decision settles the
in any and every case, whether touching on the conduct of public officer3 or the 1e-
havior of private citizens. It is true that if such were the case it would be lzyond the
intendment of the statute as well as common law. See In the Matter of Healy, 161 Mie.
532, 293 N.Y. Supp. 534 (Queens County Ct. 1937); In the Matter of Third Sept. 1953
Grand Jury, 19 Misc. 2d 682, 193 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Ct. Gen. Ses. 1959). However, the
majority failed to see the distinction between the functions exercicd by the grand
jury under § 253(2) and § 245. The argument of the dissent, which the majority aE:umcd
hypothetically for the purpose of the reductio, required that this distinction he made,
namely, that in inquiring and reporting under § 253(2), the grand jury's function is
administrative and not necessarily judicial, whereas under § 245 the grand jury emrckes
a purely judicial function.
21. - N.Y.2d at -, - N.E.2d at -, N.Y.S.2d at -.
22. Id. at -, - N.E.2d at -, - N.Y.S.2d at -.
23. Chief Judge Desmond makes a forceful argument from the legislative hhtory of
a bill passed by the legislature in 1946 but vetoed by Governor Dewey. N.Y. Senate. Int.
-No. 509 (1946). The majority neither meets nor considers its significance. The bill would
have forbidden a grand jury report censuring or reflecting upon the integrity of any pcr-
son for alleged misconduct not constituting a crime. Judge Dzsmond argues that the very
passage of the bill was legislative recognition of the esistence of the power to report,
and from the Governor's veto he further argued that the power had not been limited
in any way. While the argument carried weight, it may perhap3 be questioned on the
ground that this was perhaps an attempt by the legislature to confer a limited powcr to
report where before there was none. But the majority failed to urge this view.
24. See generally Jones v. People, 101 App. Div. 55, 92 N.Y. Supp. 275 (2d Dcp't),
appeal dismissed, 131 N.Y. 389, 74 N.E. 226 (1905); In the Matter of Wilcox, 153 M ic. 761,
276 .N.Y. Supp. 117 (Sup. Ct. 1934) ; Kuh, supra note 1.
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law where before there was conflict. For this reason alone the decision is im-
portant. Certainty, at least, has been obtained on this narrow but troublesome
point. Also to be determined by the legislature is the question whether the
grand jury should have the power to make reports on general conditions meriting
public attention which criticize no one. The rationale of the instant court
appears to preclude any report no matter what its contents happen to be. Let
the legislature now change the rule if it should be so advised.
Interstate Commerce-Segregation in Terminal Restaurant Violative of
the Interstate Commerce Act.-Petitioner, a Negro traveling between Wash-
ington, D.C., and Montgomery, Alabama, sought to obtain a meal at a bus
terminal restaurant during a scheduled stopover at Richmond, Virginia. Disre-
garding the restaurant's segregated facilities, he sat in and ordered from the
white section. The management twice requested that petitioner move to the
negro area, but he refused, asserting that he was an interstate traveler. Peti-
tioner was thereupon arrested and fined ten dollars for violating a statute
forbidding a person to remain on the premises of another "without authority
of law" after being asked to leave.' The intermediate appellate court and the
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction. The assignments of error
in the Virginia Supreme Court had not charged any violation of the Interstate
Commerce Act,2 but had been confined solely to the constitutional questions
raised below.3 In his petition for certiorari and in his brief on the merits, peti-
tioner again challenged only the constitutional aspects of his conviction. The
Supreme Court of the United States, with two justices dissenting, found a viola-
tion of the Interstate Commerce Act.4 Where a terminal and restaurant operate
1. Va. Code Ann. § 18.1-173 (1960). "If any person shall without authority of law
go upon or remain upon the lands . . .of another, after having been forbidden to do so
... by the owner, lessee, custodian or other person lawfully in charge thereof . ..he
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished
by a fine . . .or by confinement in jail . .. ."
2. 49 Stat. 558 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 316(d) (1958). Petitioner had initially charged
in the intermediate appellate court that he had a right under the act to be free of any
unjust discrimination or any unreasonable prejudice in the course of his interstate passage.
3. Petitioner had also argued at the district court level that his conviction was obtained
in violation of the commerce clause, and the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment.
4. Despite strong objection by the dissent that petitioner had not challenged his con-
viction on the statutory grounds, Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 464 (1960), the Court
approached the case solely on that basis. Though somewhat unusual, it would appear that
the Court's action was proper. By virtue of the Supreme Court's Revised Rules, the dis-
cretionary nature of certiorari has been expanded. Under prior rules, "only the questions
specifically brought forward by the petition for writ of certiorari will be considered."
U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 38(2) (1939). The present rules, however, provide that "only the
questions set forth in the petition or fairly comprised therein will be considered ...."
U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 23(1)(c) (1954). Deletion of "specifically" from the old rule and the
addition of "or fairly comprised therein" to the new, clearly carries the discretionary
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as an integral part of a carrier's transportation service for its interstate passen-
gers, such passengers have a right under the Interstate Commerce Act not to
be discriminated against. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
Since the landmark decision in Henderson v. United States,5 there is no longer
any doubt that racial discrimination on board interstate carriers is violative
of the Interstate Commerce Act. In Henderson, a railroad operated dining car
facilities on a segregated basis, and the United States Supreme Court found that
segregation, as such, constituted an unreasonable prejudice within the compass
of the act.6 Although the Court relied specifically upon section 3 (1) 7 of the act,
sections 216(d)8 and 404(b)O impose similar restrictions upon motor and
airplane carriers. 10 These antidiscrimination requirements are, of course, not
element of certiorari beyond its original grant, permitting a consideration of iz:ue3 not
specifically presented but fairly comprised in those actually brought before the Court.
The majority, in exercising its discretion, pointed out the fact that racial discrimination
was the crux of both the constitutional and statutory questions: "Discrimination becauze
of color is the core of the two broad constitutional questions prezented to us by petitioner,
just as it is the core of the Interstate Commerce Act question . . . ." 364 US. at 457.
Objection was also raised on the ground that the statutory iscue had not been conidered
by the Supreme Court of Virginia. Although the general rule is that queztions not raised
in the court below will not be considered by the Supreme Court, Magruder v. Drury,
235 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1914), the Court has recognized exceptions where the error posed
is fundamental, Gila Valley, Globe & No. Ry. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94, 9S-99 (1914), or
where the case itself is an unusual or exceptional one, Law, n v. United States, 355 U.S.
339, 362 n.16 (1958) ; Duignan v. United States, 274 U.S. 195, 200 (1927). It has alo baen
argued that the applicability of a statute cannot be avoided even in the abs-ence of its
presentation to a Court, "for ... [the court is] bound by the law of the land, whether
cited to us by counsel or not." Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc.,
234 F.2d 538, 546 (2d Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion). For a criticism of this practice,
see the partial dissents of Justices Frankfurter and Harlan in NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352
U.S. 282, 294, 303 (1957). Although the more thorny constitutional isue3 were thereby
avoided, the Court's application of the Interstate Commerce Act to the instant rituation
seems justified.
5. 339 U.S. S16 (1950).
6. Id. at 825. Initially, the Interstate Commerce Commission ruled that even though
Henderson had been subjected to undue prejudice, the discriminatory act was merely an
isolated incident resulting from poor judgment on the part of a railroad employee and
that segregation on interstate carriers was not of itself violative of the act. Henderson
v. Southern Ry, 253 I.C.C. 413, 419 (1944). This view was rejected by the Supreme
Court. See also Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 20 (1941) (segregation on Pullman
car violative of the Interstate Commerce Act).
7. 54 Stat. 902 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1953). "It shall be unlawful for any common
carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter to make, give, or cause any undue or
unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular perzon ...in any rcsp-ct what-
soever; or to subject any particular person ...to any undue or unreaonab!e prejudice
or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever ...."
S. 49 Stat. 553 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 316(d) (1953).
9. 72 Stat. 760 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (195S).
10. With regard to motor carriers, the question has bcmn resolved formally on the basis
that segregation on board an interstate carrier constitutes an undue burden on interstate
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limited to on-board activity." Railroad and bus terminals have likewise been
brought within the act's restrictions, 12 the former by section 1 (3) (a), 13 which
expressly classifies railroad terminals as carriers, and the latter by section
203(a) (19),14 which delimits the "services" to which the act applies. Section
203 (a) (19) includes facilities "used in the transportation of passengers .. . or
in the performance of any service in connection therewith."' 5 However, this
section also requires that the facility be "controlled" or "operated" by the
carrier in question. As the dissent stressed'0 and as the majority noted,', the
restaurant in the present case was neither directly controlled nor operated by
the carrier. The dissent construed section 203 (a) (19) literally and discharged
both restaurant and carrier from any liability under the act.18 The majority
emphasized the circumstantial relationship existing between restaurant and
carrier,' 9 the latter by providing dining facilities to its interstate passengers
and the former by co-operating in the undertaking. Assumption of this dual
relationship led the Court to fasten upon the restaurant the same restrictions
against discrimination as were imposed upon the carrier itself.20 By its refusal
to adopt a narrow construction of section 203 (a) (19), practical effect was given
to the act's primary purpose, i.e., the abolition of discriminations touching upon
interstate commerce.2 ' The Court's conclusion clearly accords with the broad
commerce in violation of U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (commerce clause). Morgan v.
Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
11. This is spelled out generally by § 202(b) of the act: "The provisions of this
chapter apply . .. to the procurement of and the provision of facilities for . . . trans-
portation ... [by an interstate carrier]." 49 Stat. 543 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 302(a) (1958).
12. See the dicta of both the majority and the dissent in the instant case, to the effect
that discrimination in transportation services in terminals and terminal restaurants actually
owned, operated or controlled by interstate carriers is unlawful. Boynton v. Virginia,
364 U.S. 454, 459 (1960) (majority); Id. at 465 (dissent). This is so even though there
be an incidental use by the general public. See Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 127 I.C.C. 1,
48-53 (1927).
13. 41 Stat. 474 (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(3)(a) (1958).
14. 49 Stat. 545 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 303(a)(19) (1958).
15. Ibid.
16. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 465-66 (1960).
17. Id. at 460.
18. Id. at 468.
19. Id. at 460-61.
20. Ibid.
21. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284, 300 (1947); Mitchell v. United
States, 313 U.S. 80, 94 (1941); Louisville & N. R.R. v. United States, 282 U.S. 740, 749
(1931).
It was early advised in interpreting the act that "the general purpose of the act and
the evils sought to be remedied must be always kept in mind, and .. .parts of the act
are not to be so construed as to defeat other important features of the same; nor is such
a construction to be given to the act, in whole or in part, as may tend to prevent the
proper enforcement of the legislative purpose." Van Patten v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry.,
81 Fed. 545, 547 (N.D. Iowa 1897); cf. Smith v. Townsend, 148 U.S. 490, 494 (1893). It
construction traditionally given the act.2
Application of this fairly clear principle was somewhat clouded, however,
by a caveat of the Court. The instant opinion specifically avoided questions
relating to carrier stops at restaurants along interstate routes.P While the
Court spoke in terms of the terminal building constituting one project for a
single purpose, with facilities geared primarily to the service of bus companies
and their interstate passengers, it would appear that the rationale advanced
by the Court admits of application beyond the terminal type situation.
It is not uncommon for interstate carriers to schedule stops at predesignated
restaurants along their routes. If the Court be correct in reasoning that direct
control is not necessary to fasten responsibility upon a restaurant, but only
active co-operation in the undertaking, there would seem to be no substantial
basis for distinguishing between roadside and terminal situations. Only slight
stress was placed on the restaurant's permanent terminal location, indicating that
the Court relied more on the voluntary relationship flowing between carrier and
facility. In the ordinary roadside situation the two essential elements of the
Court's test are equally present. The carrier, in stopping, obviously offers dining
accommodations to its passengers, and the restaurant, in accepting carrier
patronage, effects the necessary acquiescence or co-operation of which the
Court spoke. This, of course, does not mean that a proprietor is under any
statutory obligation to accept the carrier's trade. If, however, he willingly bene-
fits from this trade as a matter of customary practice,-1 it is not unreasonable
to find a dual relationship existing.
More difficult of solution are instances where the carrier makes an un-
scheduled stop at or near a roadside restaurant. The basic test, however, would
remain the same--have the two elements of the basic relationship been as-
sumed? It is suggested that the carrier's intention to furnish dining facilities
as part of its regular transportation services may reasonably be inferred from
the very nature of interstate passages covering relatively long distances; the
restaurant's acquiescence may be implied from its serving those whom it knows
or ought to know are traveling in interstate commerce.2 5
has been further suggested that the act was not for the benefit of carriers but to protect
passengers agai-t unreasonable discriminations. See Central R.R. v. achor Line, 219
Fed. 716, 718 (2d Cir. 1914).
22. See, e.g., Texas & P. Ry. v. I.C.C., 162 US. 197, 213-20 (1S96). Cf. Wetern Union
Tel. Co. v. Boegli, 251 U.S. 315, 316 (1920).
23. Boyton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1960). The Court alho left op:n the
question whether a terminal lunchroom would be permitted to discriminate where the
concession did not constitute an integral part of the passenger ser-ice performed by the
carrier. Id. at 463 n.4.
24. Cf. 'Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). In treating an analogous probkcm,
an attempt by a private individual to curtail the exercise of free speech on his prop2rty,
the Court underscored the preference to be accorded individual rights conflicting with
property rights: "The more an owner, for his ad,-antage, opns up his prop-rty for urze
by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribcd by the ctatutory
and constitutional rights of those who use it." Id. at 506 (dictum).
25. These situations are not to be confused %ith a fact pattern found in Williams v.
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Even though the instant rule provides another means for eliminating dis-
crimination, the statutory problem could be rendered moot should the Court
choose to resolve the constitutional questions posed in this case. By adherence
to its traditional policy of avoiding constitutional issues unless absolutely re-
quired to resolve them,26 the Court has, perhaps unfortunately, retreated from
further clarifying the constitutional aspects of racial discrimination latent in
its recent segregation decisions. Classifications or exclusions based solely on
color have been recognized as constitutionally suspect.27 Such artificial conduct
has been condemned as inherently unreasonable in both public education 8
and public recreation.29 But since the protections of the fourteenth amendment
run against state action as distinguished from purely private action,30 the reach
of the amendment remains a major question. 31 General toleration of private
Howard Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959), where an interstate traveler
by private motor vehicle sought to invoke the act's protection. The Fourth Circuit held
that an independent restaurant along an interstate route violated neither the Constitution
nor the Interstate Commerce Act when it refused to serve a person on racial grounds. Id.
at 848. With respect to the statutory question, the court pointed out that no carrier or
carrier facility was involved. Regarding the alleged violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the court found no state activity within the meaning of the amendment. Mere
licensing of the restaurant by the state was held insufficient to create the necessary nexus
with the private activity.
26. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See
also 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 332 (8th ed. 1927). "It must be evident to
any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the Judge,
conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case
where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the
responsibility." Ibid.
27. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). See also Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), where the Court said: "Pressing public necessity may some-
times justify the existence of such . . . [classifications]; racial antagonism never can."
Id. at 216. And see Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), which sets out the
rationale of the rule: "distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine
of equality." Id. at 100.
28. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (segregation unreasonable as foster-
ing sense of inferiority in Negro); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637
(1950) (established Negro law school unreasonably inhibits ability to adequately learn
legal profession); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (specially created law school
lacks intangible advantages of established school).
29. Dawson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), aff'd
per curiam, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (same as Brown and Bolling rationales) ; Fayson v. Beard,
134 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Tex. 1955) (segregation psychologically unreasonable).
30. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Nowhere, however, was it suggested that
racial discrimination, as such, is reasonable. In fact the contrary may be inferred by
reason of the constitutional ban on state discrimination.
31. Petitioner also argued that his conviction was obtained in violation of art. I, § 8,
cl. 3 of the Constitution. Although the vast majority of cases respecting the application
of the commerce clause concern state statutes (see, e.g., Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373
(1946) (segregated seating on board interstate motor carriers)), it is generally recognized
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discrimination was sharply curtailed by the Supreme Court in Shdely v. Krae-
;wer,32 where a private discriminatory covenant was sought to be enforced
through the state courts. The state court action was found to be an adoption
of the individual bias. The Supreme Court reasoned that but for the judicial
intervention, the private discrimination would not have been as successfully
effectuated. 3  The instant situation advances a half step further, posing the
interesting query whether state prosecution for trespass, occasioned by racial
motives, also is sufficient to constitute a prohibited adoption of individual dis-
crimination. In Shelley, the racially restrictive covenant operated to interfere
with the possessory rights of the Negro landowner. His property rights were
in issue. In the trespass situation, on the other hand, the property rights of the
one who discriminates are in issue. This latter situation, therefore, must involve
a balancing of conflicting interests--of an individual's constitutional right not
to have the state adopt arbitrary racial discrininations against him with a
landowner's allegedly absolute right to exclude others from his land. If a pro-
prietor demands that an individual leave his prenises because of a racial motive,
and the Negro refuses, the proprietor will be forced to eject the Negro himself
if police assistance is unavailable. Yet, to permit police enforcement of clearly
arbitrary conduct runs dangerously close to the conduct condemned in Shey.
The problem for the Court to determine is whether this property right is to
take precedence over the deprivation of liberty resulting from a trespass con-
viction. The question was recently sidestepped when the Court declined
to review a disorderly conduct conviction based on a refusal to leave a lunch
counter at the city mayor's request. The Court, however, refused consideration
because the petitioner's state remedies had not been exhausted.24 One sourcehas suggested that the Supreme Court is not ready to interfere with a revered
property right in light of the "moderate statutory fine or jail sentence" attending
a trespass conviction.35 This reasoning, however, completely overlooh s the less
that prohibitions against burdening commerce are not limited to state obstruction. See
In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 531 (1895) (union activity obstructing commerce and the
mails); Chance v. Lambeth, 186 F.2d S79, SSO, S,3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 US. 941
(1951) (private company regulations a burden on commerce). In Whiteide v. Southern
Bus Lines, Inc., 177 F.2d 949, 953 (6th Cir. 1949), the court, after holding a private
carrier's segregation on board the carrier an undue burden on commerce, suggetcd that,
if it be required that there he state action before the court vil invalidate the practice,
it was present by reason of a state police officer's ejection of the Negro. Except for
the stationary nature of the restaurant in the instant case, the two fact patterns are
strikingly similar. An objection based on this distinction is obviated by Supreme Court
holdings that have declared certain stationary accommodations within the federal domain.
See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 213 (1947) (varehouw ucd for
grain storage).
32. 334 U.S. 1 (1943).
33. Id. at 19.
34. Steele v. City of Tallahassee, 29 U.S.L. Week 3261 tU.S. March 6, 1961).
35. 57 Mich. L. Re,. 122 (1953), commenting on a decision by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina which held that defendants in a racially provoked trespass pro'ecution
have no constitutionally protected right not to be discriminated against by an op2rator
of a private enterprise. State v. Clyburn, 247 N.C. 455, 101 S.E.2d 295 (1953).
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tangible, but more devastating consequences following a criminal conviction
of any sort. Where race is used as the basis for determining the right of occu-
pancy of public or quasi-public areas, and state power, either police or judicial,
is exercised to give practical effect to such exclusions, it would appear that such
action falls within the proscription of the fourteenth amendment.
The problems, therefore, are clear. The method of solution is available. The
time would seem proper for the Court to shed light on an area of recurring legal
uncertainty.
Labor Law-Federal Pre-emption of State Court's Jurisdiction Over Labor
Dispute. -Plaintiff employer sought injunctive relief against recognitional pick-
eting by two minority unions. Previously, plaintiff had recognized and contracted
with a different and independent union which represented a majority of his
employees. The granting of an injunction by the New York Supreme Court,
Special Term, was affirmed by the appellate division.' The New York Court of
Appeals reversed. The court held (1) that state court jurisdiction had been
pre-empted because the employer's business activities were arguably subject
to Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act2 and (2) that the question of
state jurisdiction had been rendered moot by the recently enacted Section
(8) (b) (7) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.8 Dooley
v. Anton, 8 N.Y.2d 91, 168 N.E.2d 356, 202 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1960).
The National Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction over all labor disputes
affecting interstate commerce.4 The Board's authority, however, is discretionary,6
and, pressed by an ever-increasing caseload and budgetary problems, it has
never exercised its jurisdiction to the fullest extent. Rather, it has acted in
accordance with certain yardsticks" and general policies.1 Cases failing to meet
these self-imposed limitations were left without a federal forum even though
technically falling within the ambit of the act. Of necessity, complainants
1. Dooley v. Anton, 7 App. Div. 2d 880, 182 N.Y.S.2d 314 (4th Dep't 1959) (memo-
randum decision).
2. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), amended by 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1958).
3. 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (Supp. I, 1959). Section 8(b) (7) of the
act expressly made recognitional or organizational picketing an unfair labor practice where
the employer has already lawfully recognized another union and a question concerning
representation may not be raised under § 9(c). National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453
(1935), amended by 61 Stat. 144 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1958); 29
U.S.C. § 159(c) (Supp. I, 1959).
4. Labor Management Relations Act § 10(a), 61 Stat. 146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(a) (1958).
5. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 701(a), 73 Stat. 541,
29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (Supp. I, 1959).
6. For a detailed enumeration of these standards, see Comment, 28 Fordham L. Rev.
737, 747-48 (1960).
7. See CCH Lab. L. Rep. ff 1610 (1 Lab. Rel.) (1960).
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turned to state courts and agencies for relief.8 The availability of these forums,
however, was rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States in Guss v.
Utah Labor Relations Bd.' There a state agency had granted relief from an
unfair labor practice in a case over which the Board had declined jurisdiction.10
The Supreme Court set aside the state board judgment on the ground that the
NTLRB had been vested with exclusive jurisdiction by Congress. In effect, the
Court held that the National Labor Relations Act displaced state power in
cases where jurisdiction had actually been declined, or would in all likelihood be
declined, by the NLRB under its jurisdictional limitations. The result of the
decision was that many complainants found themselves in a "no man's land,"
i.e., without any forum for their cases.
Despite the Gzss ruling, the New York Court of Appeals subsequently held
in Pleasant Valley Packing Co. v. Talaricoll that recognitional picketing by a
stranger union, where another union had been certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent of the employees, was neither a protected' nor prohibited
activity 3 under the act, and therefore state courts could assume jurisdiction.
After Pleasant Valley, however, and subsequent to the time the instant case
was decided in the lower courts, the Supreme Court decided San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon.1' In that case a union was engaged in peaceful
picketing for the purpose of forcing an employer to sign a union shop agreement.
In reversing a judgment of the California Supreme Court's which granted the
employer tort damages for injuries caused by the union's activities, the Supreme
Court held that when an activity is arguably subject to either section 7 or
section 8 of the act,1 only the NLRB has jurisdiction.' 7 In effect, whereas
3. For a detailed discussion of the case history, see Flkmin.z, Title VII: The Taft-
Hartley Amendments, 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 666 (1960); Isaacson, Federal Pre-emption Undcr
the Taft-Hartley Act, 11 Ind. & Lab. ReL Rev. 391 (195S); Meltzer, The Supreme Court,
Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations (pts. 1-2), 59 Colum. L. Rev. 6,
269 (1959); Comment, 2S Fordham L. Rex. 737 (1960).
9. 353 U.S. 1 (1957), 26 Fordham L. Rev. 349.
10. Appellant corporation was charged by the United Steel WorLers of America, the
certified bargaining representative, vith violations of the Taft-Hartley Act, after the
regional director of the NLRB declined to issue a complaint because the company's
business was of a local character.
11. 5 N.Y.2d 40, 152 N.E.2d 505, 177 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1933).
12. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act gives unions the right to enag in
certain activities such as the right to self-organization and collective targaining. 49
Stat. 452 (1935), amended by 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 157 (1950).
13. Section S of the National Labor Relations Act sts forth those activitu3 forbiddcn
as unfair labor practices. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), amended by 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 15S (1953); 29 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. I, 1959).
14. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). This is the second case of the Fame name. For the firt, sE
353 U.S. 26 (1957).
15. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1953).
16. 49 StaL 452 (1935), amended by 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 US ,C § 153
(1958). The most recent amendment to § S occurred in the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 153 (Supp. I, 1959).
17. 359 U.S. at 245. The Court pointed out, however, that where the activity iL of a
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Pleasant Valley had held that any doubt was to be resolved in favor of state
jurisdiction, Garmon required such doubt to be determined in the first instance
by the NLRB. Garmon was subsequently found to be controlling in New York
in Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. McDonough.18 There a union commenced
secondary picketing of CBS with the declared purpose of preventing CBS from
doing business with two suppliers against whom the union was striking. On
the ground that it was arguable"' whether the secondary picketing constituted
an unfair labor practice under section 8 of the act, the New York Court of
Appeals unanimously affirmed the appellate division's finding that the state
courts were not primary tribunals to adjudicate such issues.
In an attempt to narrow this perplexing "no man's land" 20 area, Congress
enacted a provision in 1959 that "nothing ... shall be deemed to prevent or bar
any agency or the courts of any State or Territory . . . from assuming and
asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board declines,
pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, to assert jurisdiction."- 1 In
ascertaining the effect of this amendment, it is necessary to keep in mind its
limited scope. The amendment is confined strictly to cases which fail to meet
the limitations of the Board.2 2 State courts and agencies are allowed to assert
jurisdiction over these cases, but not over cases which do meet the Board
standards.23
violent nature, the state's power to grant compensation or to enjoin would not be pre-
empted. Id. at 247-48.
18. 6 N.Y.2d 962, 161 N.E.2d 389, 191 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1959) (memorandum decision).
19. The question of when an activity is "arguably" subject to § 7 or § 8 of the act is
clearly destined for continued court interpretation. Presently it suggests a continued
narrowing of state jurisdiction, since the act has been amended to include a number of
other types of conduct which in any given case will present a greater possibility of the act
applying. See Grunwald-Marx, Inc. v. Los Angeles Clothing Workers, 52 Cal. 2d 568, -,
343 P.2d 23, 32 (1959).
20. As introduced in the Senate, the Kennedy-Ervin bill contemplated the universal
application of federal law. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701 (1959). On the other hand,
the Landrum-Griffin bill, introduced in the House, contemplated use of state law by state
courts. H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701 (1959). When the compromise was worked
out, Senator Kennedy stated: "[It] was agreed that the State law could prevail." 105 Cong.
Rec. 16255 (daily ed. Sept. 2, 1959). Senator Goldwater, a member of the conference
committee, also reported to the Senate that the conference agreement authorized "State
labor boards and courts to assume jurisdiction and to apply State law in cases over which
the NLRB declines to assert jurisdiction." 105 Cong. Rec. 16419 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959).
21. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 701(a), 73 Stat. 542,
29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (2) (Supp. I, 1959).
22. A complainant seeking relief before a state labor agency is initially faced with the
problem of discerning whether the amendment applies to cases actually declined by the
Board or those which in all likelihood would be declined. It is probable that Congress
meant the act to cover both types of situations. See Analysis of the Landrum-Griffin
Reform Bill, 105 Cong. Rec. 13091 (daily ed. July 27, 1959). But see 105 Cong. Rec. 16393
(daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959) (remarks of Senator Morse).
23. It is not clear who is to make the initial determination as to whether or not a
case meets the Board's standards. To ease problems in this area the board has innovated
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In the principal decision, the court seems to say that all cases coming vithin
the purview of the National Labor Relations Act must be adjudicated by the
NLRB. As noted above, this is true only of cases meeting the Board's standards.
The concurring opinion of Judge Van Voorhis is more ambiguous on this
point. It emphasizes the problem inherent in the "no man's land" as it existed
prior to the 1959 amendments and adverts to section 10(a)2 4 as an ineffectual
solution to the problem, but nowhere is there any mention of section 14(c).
A consideration of this section would not support the unqualified language that
regardless of whether the National Labor Relations Board assumes or declines to
exercise jurisdiction to take steps to stop this illegal behavior, the States have been
relieved from responsibility in this kind of case.2 6
The instant court found that the peaceful recognitional picketing involved
was not violative of section 8 of the act at the time the injunction was issued
by the lower court. However, the court did find, on the basis of the Curtis
Bros. 27 decision, that it could reasonably be argued that picketing not banned
by section 8 may be protected by section 7.23 Therefore, the state court never
had jurisdiction to issue the injunction. A further compelling reason for the
court's position was found in the 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments2 3
Although the basic reasoning of the court is sound, practical problems still re-
main. When a complainant errs in selecting a state forum, he is likely to find no
federal forum available to him because of the running of the six-month statute of
limitations.3 0 This situation could probably be eliminated by expanding the
statutory period of limitations, or by requiring the NLRB to make the initial
determination as to whether or not it will assert jurisdiction. Perhaps a rule
that the statute of limitations be tolled during the period a party is innocently
advisory opinions. These opinions are available only if a proceeding is pending before a
state agency, or court, and they may be secured by a party to the precceding, the court,
or the agency. The opinion is limited solely to whether the NLRB would aEcrt jurlztction.
29 C.F.R. § 101-39 (Supp. 1960). Informal opinions may be obtained from re3onal
office personnel. 29 C.F.R. § 101.41 (Supp. 1960).
24. Section 10(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act gave the NLRB limitcd power to cede
jurisdiction to a state agency. 61 Stat. 146 (1947), as amcndcd, 29 U.S.C. § 1CO(a)
(1958). However, because of the requirement of conistency between the federal act and
state statutes which would become applicable in the event of a ceoion agrccmcnt, this
provision has proved of little value. In the few states which do have labor rdations
statutes, most are not sufficiently consistent with federal leghslation to authorize cczion.
For an outline of the different types of statutory provisions in the fifty states, see Comment,
28 Fordham L. Rev. 737, 743-47 (1960).
25. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 701(a), 73 Stat. 542, 29
U.S.C. § 164(c) (2) (Supp. I, 1959).
26. 8 N.Y.2d 91, 99, 168 N.E.2d 356, 360, 202 N.Y.S.2d 273, 278 (1960).
27. NILRB v. Drivers Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
28. 3 N.Y.2d at 93, 16S N.E.2d at 359, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 277.
29. 73 Stat. 541, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 15S, 159-60, 136-S7 (Supp. 1, 1959). See 3 N.Y.Zd
at 93, 168 N.E.2d at 359, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 277.
30. Labor Management Relations Act § 10(b), 61 Stat. 146 (1957), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 160(b) (1953).
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but mistakenly before a state forum would eliminate the difficulty. Another
dilemma facing complainants before state forums also demands resolution.
Assuming that a party is properly before such forum, i.e., there is state
jurisdiction, he may still find himself without an adequate remedy because the
vast majority of states are without labor relations statutes. 31 Solution of this
problem now rests squarely upon the states.
Labor Law-Taft-Hartley Act Does Not Pre-empt State Court of Juris-
diction Over a Labor Dispute Involving American Union and Foreign
Shipping Corporation.-Plaintiff, a Liberian corporation owned and controlled
by Italian nationals, owns two cruise ships which fly the Liberian flag and
claim Monrovia, Liberia as their home port.' Defendant union was formed in
1959 by two American maritime unions. Its purpose was to organize foreign
seamen employed on ships flying flags of convenience. Defendant union
organized the crews of plaintiff's vessels and picketed the two vessels when
they arrived in New York, with the result that the crews refused to sail, and
scheduled cruises were cancelled.2 The New York Supreme Court permanently
enjoined the defendant from interfering in any way with the operation and
management of the ships and from picketing them for any purpose. The
appellate division substantially affirmed, 3 two justices dissenting. The Taft-
Hartley Act 4 does not deprive a state court of jurisdiction to enjoin an Ameri-
can union from picketing a foreign ship while the ship is in an American port.
Incres S.S. Co. v. International Maritime Workers Union, 11 App. Div. 2d 177,
202 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1st Dep't 1960).
31. See Comment, 28 Fordham L. Rev. 737, 743-47 (1960).
1. Although both vessels claim Monrovia as their home port, neither have ever been In
Liberian waters. Brief for Appellant, p. 3, Incres S.S. Co. v. International Maritime
Workers Union, 11 App. Div. 2d 177, 202 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1st Dep't 1960). All of the
cruises commence from New York City, but the crews take their leave in Genoa, Italy,
where the ships are refitted and repaired. The crews of both vessels are of Italian nationality
and they are hired under Italian articles. Plaintiff shares a common office with its agency,
a New York corporation, which either alone or jointly with plaintiff, provisions the ships,
books passengers, and attends to some of the ships' repairs out of its New York office.
Plaintiff's president is also an officer and director of the agency.
2. Defendant's claim that the picketing was done at all times for the twofold purpose of
improving the wages and conditions of Incres seamen by attempting to become their
collective bargaining agent and of protecting the gains won by American seamen by
shortening the gap between wages and conditions on foreign ships and those on American
ships.
3. The order of the supreme court enjoined the union "from picketing said vessels for
any purpose." 11 App. Div. 2d 177, 185, 202 N.Y.S.2d 692, 700 (1st Dep't 1960). The
appellate division modified the order so that it reads "from picketing said vessels for any
such purpose." Ibid. Its reason for doing so was to limit the injunction to the condemned
activity as presented in the instant case.
4. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 141 (1958); 29 U.S.C. §§ 158-60, 164, 186-87 (Supp. I, 1959).
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The doctrine of pre-emption in the field of labor relations was enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Garner v. Teamsters Union.0 There it was held that
although the union's conduct violated a state labor act, the state court did not
have jurisdiction to issue an injunction because the conduct was an unfair labor
practice under Section S of the Taft-Hartley Act." The recent case of San
Diego Bldg. Trades Cozncil v. Garmon7 further expanded the concept of federal
pre-emption so that if certain conduct is "arguably" protected under scction
7,8 or is "arguably" an unfair labor practice under section 8, the courts must
yield to the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. The
decisions reflect the intent of Congress to have a uniform federal labor policy.
Before the Garmon decision, the Court had held in Benz v. Compania
Naviera Hidalgo, S.A. 0 that the Taft-Hartley Act did not apply to a damage
suit against an American union resulting from the picketing of a foreigm ship
5. 346 U.S. 435 (1953).
6. 49 Stat 452 (1935), amended by 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 US,C. § 153
(1958), 29 U.S.C. § 15S (Supp. I, 1959).
7. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). This is the second case of the same name. For the firzt, cce 353
U.S. 26 (1957). The result of the second Garmon decision and those that prczeed it,
particularly the Garner case, is to allow the Board to make the primary determination of
whether or not it will handle a specific case. Although in NLRB v. Fainblatt, 30 US.
601 (1939), the Supreme Court declared that the Board's power is coextcnclve vAth the
scope of the commerce clause, the Board has refused to exercise its jurisdiction to the
fullest extent. Instead, it takes jurisdiction in accordance with certain published monetary
standards. See Comment, 2S Fordham L. Rev. 737, 747.43 (190). As a rezult of the
Board's attitude and the decision of the Supreme Court in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations
Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957), 26 Fordham L. Rev. 349, where it was held that the Board's
determination not to handle a particular case did not give the state authority to do co,
a "no man's land" developed. Section 701 of the Labor-Mlanagement Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 541, 29 U.S.C. § 164 (Supp. I, 1959), was enacted to
remedy this situation, allowing state courts and boards to assert juridliction over matters
where the Board has declined, or would likely decline, to do so.
The Garmon decision pointed out that the federal statute would not pre-empt the
state of jurisdiction if the case involved violence. 359 U.S. at 247-48.
3. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), amended by 61 Slat. 140 (1947),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1953).
9. 353 U.S. 133 (1957). This case involved the picketing of a ship owned by a
Panamanian corporation and sailed under a Liberian flag. None of the crew, vas American
and the articles were prescribed by the British Maritime Board. Several days after the
ship had sailed into an American port the crew "went on strike on board the veczel and
refused to obey the orders of the Master. They demanded that their term of sErvice he
reduced, their wages be increased, and more favorable conditions of employmnent be
granted." Id. at 139-40. The Mlaster ordered the striking members of the crew off the rhip.
Three different unions then picketed the ships to compel, as the trial court found, the
corporation to rehire the crew at more favorable rates and conditions for a shorter term
than that provided for in the articles. The district court granted the injunctions but
shortly thereafter the ship sailed from the American port and has not returned iince.
Because of this fact, the court of appeals dismissed the question of an injunction as
being moot, Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 205 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 19.53), and
therefore the question was never decided by the Supreme Court.
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operated entirely by foreign seamen while the vessel was temporarily in an
American port. In Benz, the dispute arose on board ship. After a strike was
called by the crew, which picketed in its own behalf, the American unions
picketed in sympathy. The rationale of the decision was that Congress did not
intend the Taft-Hartley Act to apply to labor disputes between foreign crews
and their employers. 10 Both prior to and after Benz, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board has consistently refused to take jurisdiction of certain foreign
shipping disputes." The Board, however, has based its decisions on the
nationality of the employers, while the Benz Court looked to the nationality of
the crew.' 2 The Benz test of nationality was apparently disregarded in AIran
10. 353 U.s. at 143-44.
11. In Compania Maritima Sansoc Limitada, CCH Lab. L. Rep. 1 1610 (.172) (1 Lab.
Re].) (1950), the Board dismissed a petition to represent the alien crew of a vessel which
was registered under the laws of Panama, owned by a Panamanian corporation, a majority
of whose stockholders were of foreign countries. The Board did so because the internal
economy of a vessel of foreign registry and ownership was involved. Immediately fol-
lowing this decision, the Board refused to assert jurisdiction in a case involving picketing.
Sailor's Union, 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950). There, one-third of the stock in the Panamanian
corporation was owned by American citizens. The union asked to become bargaining
agent for the foreign crew but the corporation refused to recognize them as such. The
union then proceeded to picket the ship while it was in dry dock. Sometime after the
picketing began, a majority of the crew petitioned the union to bargain for them col-
lectively. The union's petition to be certified as the bargaining agent of the crew was
dismissed by the board's regional director. The NLRB affirmed on the ground that
the corporation was not an employer within the meaning of the act and hence It could
not assert judisdiction. Subsequently, in an administrative ruling, the General Counsel of the
Board refused to issue a complaint on the union's charge of unfair labor practices under § 8
of the act. 44 L.R.R.M. 1363 (July 13, 1959). The General Counsel stated that the Board
could not assert jurisdiction because none of the essential aspects of the employer-
employee relationship were domestic in origin. The Board distinguished Peninsular &
Occidental S.S. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1958), on the ground that there all of the stock
in the corporation was owned by foreign nations, its offices were abroad, the crew was
entirely foreign, and the articles were executed abroad.
In Peninsular, the Board asserted jurisdiction in a representation proceeding. The
Board distinguished the Benz case because in that case the true owners of the ship were
foreigners, while here the beneficial owners were American and the crew signed American
articles. However, the Board seemed to be aware of the larger problem before them-the
harmful effect that all the flag of convenience ships have upon American labor conditions.
In the opinion it said that the crews on board these ships are "in direct competition with
American seamen for employment opportunities aboard the vessels, and that the organization
of the vessels' crews with a view to improving their working conditions is, therefore, a
matter of concern to American seamen." Id. at 1102. In another representation proceed-
ing, Eastern Shipping Corp., 44 L.R.R.M. 1571 (Sept. 21, 1959), the Board reversed
the regional director's ruling dismissing the representation petition, and asserted jurisdiction.
Unlike the Peninsular case, here the American ownership of the corporation was nominal.
12. 353 U.S. at 143-44. The Court relies heavily on Representative Hartley's remarks
that "the bill ...has been formulated as a bill of rights both for American working men
and for their employers"; and again that "the American workingman has been deprived
of his dignity as an individual." H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sem. 4 (19.17).
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Trans. Co. v. National Maritime Union,1 3 where a district court, without deter-
mining whether the corporation was foreign-owned, distinguished Benz because
the suit at bar was for an injunction and not for damages. The problem of
whether to look to the nationality of crew or owner is not present in the instant
case, since both are foreign.' 4
Recently the Supreme Court distinguished between the applicability of the
Taft-Hartley Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act'G in such disputes. In Marine
Cooks, AFL v. Panama S.S. Co.,' the Court skirted the Benz decision by
holding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprived federal district courts of
jurisdiction to enjoin an American union from picketing a foreign vessel while
the vessel was temporarily in an American port. In effect, the Court has
indicated that the Norris-LaGuardia Act is broader in its application than the
Taft-Hartley Act,17 i.e., that while Taft-Hartley will not operate to pre-empt
These statements appear to indicate that the primary reason that the act was held not
to apply in the Benz case was that the crew in Benz was composed of foreign worldngmen,
not American workingmen. Apparently, the Board has uscd a different criteria in determinvi-
ing whether or not to assert jurisdiction, namely, whether the employers are American
or foreign. See note 11 supra.
13. 169 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). The court held that since the plaintiff em-
ployer's exclusive remedy for unfair labor practices under the Taft-Hartley Act was
through the Board, and the plaintiff had not availed itself of this procedure, the plaintiff
could not petition the court for an injunction because any other form of injunctive
relief was prohibited by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. But see Fianza Cia Nay. SA. v.
Benz, 173 F. Supp. 243 (D. Ore. 195S).
14. 11 App. Div. 2d 177, 179-SO, 202 N.Y.S.2d 692, 694-95 (1st Dep't 1960).
15. 47 StaL 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1953), provides that "no court of the United
States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or pzrmanent
injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any
person or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as theze terms are herdn
defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts. . . ." The
same section then goes on to list nine specific types of activities against which injunctions
may not be issued if a "labor dispute" is involved. See alzo CCH Lab. L. Rep. f C430
(3 Lab. Rel.) (1960).
16. 362 U.S. 365 (1950). "The question in the Benz case was whether the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 governed the internal labor relations of a fordgn chip
and its foreign workers under contracts made abroad while that ship happened tem-
porarily to be in American waters. The Benz case decided that the Labor Management
Relations Act had no such scope or coverage and that it accordingly did not pre-empt
the labor relations field so as to bar an action for damages for unlawful pichcting under
Oregon law. Nothing was said or intimated in Benz that would justify an inference that
because a United States District Court has power to award damages in state case growing
out of labor disputes it also has the power to issue injunctions in like situations. That
question-United States courts' jurisdiction to issue injunctions in cases like this-i
to be controlled by the Norris-LaGuardia Act." Id. at 369.
17. In a case decided subsequent to the instant case, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit availed itself of the reasoning employed in Marine Cooks, 51pm.
The court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act precluded the issuance of an injunction,
and at the same time expressly declared that it would not decide whether the Labor
Management Relations Act applied to the controversy. The fact situation was very much
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the dispute, Norris-LaGuardia will operate to prevent a court from enjoining it.
The majority in the instant case appears to have adopted this view.18
This distinction appears valid. "Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act
to curtail and regulate the jurisdiction of courts, not, as it passed the Taft-
Hartley Act, to regulate the conduct of people engaged in labor disputes."19
However, the two acts are not so far apart in their objectives and purposes that
the one can be applied in a dispute between a foreign-owned ship and an
American union, while the other cannot.20 To determine whether the Taft-
Hartley Act is applicable the courts and Board have usually looked to the
nationality of the parties. A more realistic test would concern the subject
matter of the dispute. There can be no pre-emption by the federal labor
statutes unless a dispute between an American union and a foreign shipping
corporation comes within the scope21 of the act.22 The Supreme Court has
declared that the power given to the Board under the act is coextensive with
the scope of the commerce clause.23 It is a "well-settled principle that it is the
like the instant case except that 517 of the stockholders were American citizens. However,
the latter fact did not seem to influence the court in reaching its conclusion. Madison
Shipping Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 282 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1960).
18. 11 App. Div. 2d at 184, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
19. Marine Cooks, AFL v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 372 (1960).
20. The Norris-LaGuardia Act § 2, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1958), states
as a declaration of public policy that the "individual unorganized worker . . . [should]
have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment. . . ." The
National Labor Relations Act § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), amended by 61 Stat. 136 (1947),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958), states that "it is declared to be the policy of the
United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow
of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection."
21. National Labor Relations Act § 2(7), 49 Stat. 450 (1935), amended by 61 Stat. 137
(1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1958). Subsection 7 of § 2 states that "tile
term 'affecting commerce' means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce
or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burden-
ing or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce."
22. The term "act" refers to the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act),
as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) and
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. At times, the text refers
to the Taft-Hartley Act instead of the National Labor Relations Act and al the amend-
ments.
23. NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939). The act defines "commerce" to mean "trade,
traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States . . . or
between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia .. . or
between points in the same State but through ... any foreign country." National Labor
Relations Act, 49 Stat. 450 (1935), amended by 61 Stat. 137 (1947), as amended, 28
U.S.C. § 152(6) (1958).
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effect upon interstate or foreign commerce, not the source of the injury which
is the criterion" determining whether the Board can assert jurisdiction under the
act.-2 Also, Congress and the courts have been long aware of the harmful effect
that the substandard wages and conditions on board these foreign vessels
have had upon American interstate and foreign commerce.2-
The instant court, in deciding on the basis of Bcnz that there was no pre-
emption, failed to distinguish between the nature of the disputes in the two
cases. In the instant case the American union had a valid and vital interest
in the wages and conditions that existed on the two Incres steamships, not-
withstanding that they were owned by foreign nationals. Both ships were
constantly plying in and out of New York harbor. If the wages of the crew and
the working conditions were substandard, it presented a recurring threat to
the status achieved by American labor unions. Here it was the union which
organized the crew, and which first claimed injury by reason of the substandard
wages and working conditions. The union thus became a party genuinely
interested in the dispute. In Benz, on the other hand, the American union did
not have an interest in the original subject matter of the dispute. It picketed
the ship out of sympathy for the already picketing crew, which had been
dismissed because of a shipboard dispute that arose while the ship was maling
its one and only appearance in American waters.
Conceding that Benz was properly decided, it should be limited to its facts.
It is submitted that in determining whether or not to apply the Taft-Hartley
Act the courts and the Board should look beyond the identity of the parties
to the origins and subject matter of the dispute and to its effect upon interstate
and foreign commerce. The instant case presents a situation that at least
satisfies the test of being arguably within the jurisdiction of the NLRB.2 0
24. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 222 (1933). See Continental
Oil Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 473, 477 (10th Cir. 1940). Accord, NLRB v. Vulcan Forging
Co., 1SS F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1951); NLRB v. Gulf Public Serv. Co., 116 F2d 052 (5th Cir.
1941).
25. For two excellent discussions of the problems created by the "flag-of-convenince
ships," see Harolds, Some Legal Problems Arising Out of Foreign Flag Opzration, 23
Fordham L. Rev. 295 (1959); Comment, 69 Yale L.J. 493 (1960).
26. On February 15, 1961, the NLRB, ruling on an unfair labor practice charge brought
by Seafarers International Union of North America against West India Fruit & SS. Co,
decided that the National Labor Relations Act "applied to s;hips under forcign rogistry
manned by non-resident aliens but owned by American interests and 'opating regularly
from United States harbors."' N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1961, p. 53, col 6. The Board held
that the application of the act "was not barred 'by the foreign registry of the vezels
nor by the non-resident alien status of the crew." Ibid. The basis of the decizion was
the American citizenship of the vessel's owners. This is in accord with earlier dcdiions
of the Board. See note 10 supra. The Board, however, emphasized the fact that the Lhip
had significant contacts with American commerce. N.Y. Timez, Feb. 17, 195, p. 53,
cols. 6-7. See Navcos Corp. v. National Maritime Union, - Pa. -, 166 A.2d 625 (19O).
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Master and Servant-Serviceman Proceeding to Next Duty Assignment
in Private Vehicle Within the Scope of His Employment.-An Army officer
driving his private vehicle en route from one duty station to another collided
with plaintiff's automobile in New York State. Plaintiffs brought an action
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act' for death and
injuries sustained in the accident. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of South Carolina granted a Government motion for
summary judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed, one judge dissenting. Under applicable New York law if the
work of the employee has created the necessity for the travel, the servant is
acting within the scope of his employment even though he is also serving at
the same time a purpose of his own. To hold the master liable it is not necessary
for him to retain control of the details of driving as long as the vehicle is
being operated with his consent and in furtherance of his business. Cooner v.
United States, 276 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1960).
Suits against the United States arising out of the negligence of its
employees acting within the scope of their employment are under the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the federal district courts. 2 The district courts are required
to apply the law of the state where the accident occurred in determining
liability of the Government under the doctrine of respondeat superior.3 Federal
court decisions form a confusing pattern,4 reflecting the divergence in the
application of respondeat superior by the various states. Generally, courts
finding an employer not liable for the negligent driving of his employee where
the travel is in furtherance of the former's business and the use of the auto-
mobile is at least impliedly authorized have done so on the theory that the
employer has not retained control or the right to control the instrumentality.0
This so-called particular instrumentality rule has been rejected by a substantial
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1958): "The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions
of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances .
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958).
3. Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857 (1955) (per curiam).
4. Compare Chapin v. United States, 258 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1958); United States v.
Sharpe, 189 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1951); United States v. Eleazer, 177 F.2d 914 (4th Cir.
1949), and Paly v. United States, 125 F. Supp. 798 (D. Md. 1954), aff'd per curiam, 221
F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1955), with Hinson v. United States, 257 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1958);
United States v. Mraz, 255 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1958); United States v. Kennedy, 230
F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1956), and Hopper v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Tenn.
1953), aff'd, 214 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1954). See also Sample v. United States, 178 F. Supp.
259 (D. Minn. 1959). The problem is discussed in Note, 19 Fed. B.J. 215 (1959).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Eleazer, supra note 4; Henkemann v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 180 Md. 591, 26 A.2d 418 (1942); Wesolowski v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
308 Pa. 117, 162 At. 166 (1932); Kennedy v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 130 Tex. 155, 107
S.W.2d 364 (1937). See also Note, 52 Dick. L. Rev. 61 (1947).
6. See Restatement (Second), Agency § 239(b) (1958); Cooner v. United States, 276
F.2d at 234.
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number of jurisdictions, which require only that the servant be engaged in
the furtherance of his master's business in an authorized manner.7
New York has not adopted a conclusive rule for determining liability. There
are holdings which would seem to support both the majority and the dissenting
opinions in the instant case. The majority accepted the language of Judge
Andrews in the leading case of Riley v. Standard Oil Co." that there is no
single, all-inclusive test to determine when a servant is or is not engaged in
his master's business. Where the travel of the employee involves a dual purpose,
the majority would, however, accept the rule enunciated by Chief Judge Cardozo
in Marks' Dependents v. Gray9 that "if the work of the employee creates the
necessity for travel, he is in the course of his employment, though he is
serving at the same time some purpose of his own."1o This test is broad
enough to encompass the facts of the principal case because here the travel
was directed by the Government and was in furtherance of the Government's
business, though the means employed were in the discretion of the officer."'
The majority rejected the Government's contention that the New York cases
require a showing that the details of driving were subject to the employer's
control.'
Since Marks' Dependents, a number of New York cases have considered
7. E.g., United States v. Mraz, 255 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1953); Kohl v. llbrt Lifson
& Sons, 12S N.J.L. 373, 25 A.2d 925 (1942); Carmin v. Port of Seattle, 10 Wash. 2d 139,
116 P.2d 33S (1941).
S. 231 N.Y. 301, 304, 132 N.E. 97-93 (1921): "No formula can be stated that vill
enable us to solve the problem whether at a particular moment a particular ccrvant is
engaged in his master's business. We recognize that the precise facts before the court will
vary the result.... But whatever the facts, the answer dpends upon a consideration of
what the servant was doing, and why, when, where and how he was doing it."
In the Riley case the court had before it the question of whether a servant who had
been on a frolic of his own had re-entered his master's business at the time of the
accident.
9. 251 N.Y. 90, 167 N.E. 1Sf (1929). This was a workmen's compensation case which
did not involve respondeat superior. In New York, however, workmen's compensation
decisions and respondeat superior cases have been cited interchangeably, though, of
course, there are obvious differences between the two. See Cooner v. United State:, 276
F.2d at 230 n.10.
10. 251 N.Y. at 93-94, 167 N.E. at 1,3.
11. Major Miller, who was at the time of the accident in a travel status, proceding by
a direct route to his next permanent duty station, was authorized but not required to uz-2
his private automobile, and was reimbursed for travel regardless of the mode of transporta-
tion used. As a member of the armed services he was subject, under the Uniform Code of
Military justice, 10 U.S.C. § 911 (1953), to military discipline for rcekles driving. 276
F.2d at 223 n.2.
12. 276 F.2d at 228, 232. The dissent took the opposite view: "The real question which
I think should be answered, under ... New York cases excepting the use of a particular
instrumentality from the employer's control and responsibility, is the relation of the
particular instrumentality, Major Miller's automobile, to the employment. This involves the
right of the Army, in its role of employer, to control its operation on this particular trip,"
Id. at 238.
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the question of control to determine the liability of an employer for the
negligent use by the employee of the latter's own vehicle in connection with
the employer's business. The majority in the present case reasoned that New
York's concern with control pertained only to the establishment of the master-
servant relationship. 13 Several of these cases, in stressing the lack of control
over the use of the private vehicle, however, would appear to have adopted
the particular instrumentality rule.14 Since these cases were involved with
the dual purpose situation and the use of the private vehicle was at least
impliedly authorized, the issue could have been resolved, no doubt, on the
authority of Marks' Dependents, without resolving the further question of
control of the instrumentality involved.
The dissent put particular reliance on Cooke v. Drigant.'0 There the court
of appeals noted that the employer had "effectively regimented the activities
of [its collection agent] ...into a pattern of minute and detailed control so
as to disprove the existence of any relationship other than that of employer and
employee."' 6 From this and from the fact that the employee had been made to
procure liability insurance the court found an implied requirement for the
use of an automobile, a requirement which would place it within the scope of
employment.' 7
13. 276 F.2d at 232. As to the application of the control factor, see Leidy, Salesmen
as Independent Contractors, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 365 (1930); Note, 37 Ore. L. Rev. 88 (1957).
14. Braice v. Saunders, 262 App. Div. 968, 30 N.Y.S.2d 223 (2d Dep't 1941) (memo-
randum decision); Dunne v. Contenti, 256 App. Div. 833, 9 N.Y.S.2d 248 (2d Dep't
1939) (memorandum decision); Malloy v. Scott, 248 App. Div. 882, 291 N.Y. Supp.
14 (2d Dep't 1936) (per curiam), aff'd per curiam, 275 N.Y. 496, 11 N.E.2d 313 (1937)
(employer had no control over employee with respect to the use of his automobile);
Haykl, v. Drees, 247 App. Div. 90, 286 N.Y. Supp. 38 (4th Dep't 1936) (employer knew
of car's use but company had no right to control the material details of the work);
Baumer v. Gottlieb, 160 Misc. 924, 291 N.Y. Supp. 16 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Fritz v. Krasne,
161 Misc. 442, 291 N.Y. Supp. 10 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd mem., 273 N.Y. 649, 8 NE.2d
330 (1936). In Fritz the court said: "The partnership did not ever control or direct in
any way the operation of the car, nor. . . .ever gave, or reserved the right to give, the
operator any directions with reference to the manner in which he was to do his work."
161 Misc. at 444-45, 291 N.Y. Supp. at 13-14.
15. 289 N.Y. 313, 45 N.E.2d 815 (1942). The employee here was an insurance agent,
which is the typical situation in cases of this kind in the state courts. For a discussion
of the status of insurance agents, see Note, 2 Wyo. L.J. 130 (1948).
16. 289 N.Y. at 316-17, 45 N.E.2d at 817. The majority of the court in the present case
interpreted this concern with control by the court as relating to whether the agent was a
servant or an independent contractor, not to the question of control of the particular
instrumentality involved. 276 F.2d at 232.
17. See 276 F.2d at 237 n.10. Another case relied on by the dissent was Natell v.
Taylor-Fichter Steel Constr. Co., 257 App. Div. 764, 15 N.Y.S.2d 327 (2d Dep't 1939),
aff'd mem., 283 N.Y. 737, 28 N.E.2d 966 (1940). Here the facts were similar to those
of the instant case, except that the question of an unauthorized passenger was also
involved. This case appeared to adopt the particular instrumentality rule, though the
majority in the present case felt that the chief factor in the case was tile unauthorized
passenger. 276 F.2d at 233 n.13.
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Although no New York case has explicitly rejected the particular instru-
mentality test, several have indicated that it is not a controlling test but only a
relevant consideration. In Gutov v. Krasne,'8 applying New Jersey law, but
remarking that there was no difference between the New York and New
Jersey rules, the court said:
In effect, what the trial court told the jury -as that liability of defendant for the
driver's acts depended upon his right to control the driver's physical operation of
the automobile at the time and place of the accident. This definition vas too narrow.
The test rather is whether the defendant had the right of general control over the
driver as to how the business.., should be done.12
In Burdo v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 0 the dissent of two justices in the
appellate division had stressed the particular instrumentality rule. The court
of appeals' affirmance without opinion is, at least, some evidence of its rejection
of the rule. Similarly, in Brown v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.)2 the
court declined an opportunity to approve the particular instrumentality rule.
In reversing on the authority of Cooke v. Drigant, the court of appeals indi-
cated that liability will be found when the employee is closely supervised by
the employer. The decision did not make a reservation of control over the
operation of the particular instrumentality a necessary norm of liability.
There has been no conclusive holding by the court of appeals on the exact
question involved. The courts have meandered from the more liberal7 rule as
set out in Marks' Dependents to the narrower requirement of control of the
particular activity., In deaing with the question of control, moreover, it has
not been made clear whether the reference is to the establishment of the
master-servant relationship, as the majority opinion in the principal case finds,
or whether it is to the particular instrumentality rule, as the dissent contends.24
Besides being one factor, among others, to be weighed in ascertaining the
relationship between the parties, the value of this rule other than as a device
to restrict liability is questionable. Just as various reasons,2 none of them
18. 266 App. Div. 302, 42 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1st Dep't 1943), aff'd mem., 292 N.Y.
602, 55 N.E.2d 372 (1944).
19. 266 App. Div. at 305, 42 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
20. 254 App. Div. 26, 28, 4 N.Y.S.2d 819, 821 (3d Dep't), aftd me., 279 N.Y. 64S
1S N.E.2d 42 (193S).
21. 263 App. Div. 872, 32 N.Y.S.2d 171 (2d Dep't 1942) (memorandum dccision), rev'd
mem., 289 N.Y. 821, 47 N.E.2d 432 (1943).
22. See 276 F.2d at 223-29.
23. See Murphy v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 345 (W.D.N.Y. 1953), dealing with a
soldier driving his own car from his duty station to his off-post living quarters. In holding
the Government not liable under New YVork respondeat superior law, the dtrict court
cited Standard Oil Co. v. Parkinson, 152 Fed. 631 (Sth Cir. 1907), and Restatement, Agency
§ 239(b) (1933), both of which set forth the particular instrumentality rule. See also
the cases cited in note 14 supra.
24. 276 F.2d at 232, 235.
25. Holmes, History of Agency (pts. 1-2), 4 Harv. L. Rev. 345 (1891), 5 Harv. L. Rev.
1 (1891); Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 Yale L.J. 105 (1916); Mlechem, Em-
ployer's Liability, 4 Ill. L. Rev. 243, 246-50 (1909); Comment, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 241 (1956).
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conclusive,2 6 have been advanced for the origin and in justification of the
doctrine of respondeat superior, so have a number of tests been used in its
application,27 though none of these has provided a suitable, all-inclusive
solution to the problem presented. Whether one is a servant, an agent, or an
independent contractor, and whether he is acting within the scope of his
employment at a given time and place, are questions which are not adequately
answered by resorting to mechanical formulae intended to be rigidly applied
to pertinent situations. To employ inflexibly a test such as the particular
instrumentality rule as a prerequisite to liability is to impose an artificial
standard for determining a relationship which is not conducive to categoriza-
tion.
In ascertaining when the master-servant relationship exists, control is the
criterion most often mentioned.28 The problem posed in the instant case, how-
ever, is whether, the master-servant relationship having been established,
control will yet have to be found in respect to the very transaction or instru-
mentality involved. To insist that it must, unduly emphasizes the requirement
of control in a situation where some other rule might be better utilized.
Stressing control may well be justified in the borrowed-servant situation.29
Cases involving that question and emphasizing the control requirement 0 lend
themselves, unfortunately, as authority for the particular instrumentality rule
under entirely different and irrelevant circumstances.3 '
It was pointed out several decades ago32 that the arrival of the automobile
created a situation where a rigid application of the control test would be
unreasonable. It is too easy to find that there was no control by the employer
of the automobile involved. To impose liability where control of the instru-
26. "From whence came the rule and a complete exposition of its pedigree are problems
as yet unanswered. The learned attempts made are admittedly ineffectual." Douglas,
Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk I, 38 Yale L.J. 584 (1929).
27. See Note, 27 Neb. L. Rev. 110, 111 (1948); Restatement (Second), Agency §§ 228,
229(2), 236, 239 (1958).
28. Leidy, Salesmen as Independent Contractors, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 365, 367 (1930).
29. E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Parkinson, 152 Fed. 681 (8th Cir. 1907) ; Brady v. Chicago
& G.W. Ry., 114 Fed. 100 (8th Cir. 1902); Byrne v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M.R.R., 61
Fed. 605 (6th Cir. 1894); Donovan v. Construction Syndicate, (1893] 1 Q.B. 629.
30. Standard Oil Co. v. Parkinson, supra note 29, at 682; Hilsdorf v. City of St. Louis,
45 Mo. 94, 98 (1869). See also Wyllie v. Palmer, 137 N.Y. 248, 33 N.E. 381 (1893), which is
relied on by the Government in the instant case. Brief for Appellee, p. 10.
31. Murphy v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 345 (W.D.N.Y. 1953); Howitt v. Hopkins,
219 App. Div. 653, 220 N.Y. Supp. 462 (3d Dep't), aff'd mer., 246 N.Y. 604, 159
N.E. 669 (1927).
32. "In the modem cases, involving automobile accidents, the automobile itself Injects
a new element; one which makes the control test difficult of proper application. The car
can be sent hither and yon; and its speed and direction are actually determined by the
driver. It is easy to construe the right to control in such a way as to make it appear that
the owner no longer has it." Leidy, Salesmen as Independent Contractors, 28 Mich. L.
Rev. 365, 375-76 (1930).
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mentality itself could not, as a practical matter, be established, some courts
found a general right to control sufficientP3 Others found, as a substitute for
control of the automobile, control over the driver with respect to his route and
activities3-1
Under the broad test laid down by the majority in the present case, such
attempts to satisfy a requirement of control, or to circumvent it, would be
unnecessary. The basic question to be answered is whose business was primarily
being furthered by the trip, considering all the elements involved.3 Control
then becomes but one of the factors to be weighed, rather than a prerequisite
to liability.
Taxation-Paid but Contested Local Real Estate Ta= Accrues as a De-
duction for Federal Income Tax Purposes in Year of Settlement.-The
taxpayer, a public utility company, owned considerable real estate on which
it paid local property taxes. From 1938-1950,I the taxpayer contesteda its
liability for a part of the tax so imposed, but paid the full amount of the
assessment under protest.3 Proceedings with respect to the years 1946-19S0
33. Quigley v. Wilson Line, 33S lass. 125, 154 N.E 2d 77 (195S).
34. Cooke v. Drigant, 2S9 N.Y. 313, 45 N.E.2d 315 (1942).
35. See 276 F.2d at 223, 234; Brief for Appellant, p. 15. Major Miller had no pm-on3l
interest in travelling from Washington to Ottawa, though in utilizing a private automobile
he was serving a purpose of his own, ie., personal convenience. Mthough he could eaore2
the particular means of travel, route and departure time, his choice was n-cuarily
restricted by the time allotted for the trip. See note 11 supra.
Under appropriate travel regulations, the Army could specify the mode of travel where
the duty to be performed required a particular form of trarportation, but in no cas2
could it direct the use of a privately owned conveyance. Under the circumstances in this
case, the Government did not reserve the right to control the mode of trave. Brief for
Appellee, pp. 15, 25.
1. Except for the years 1942 and 1943.
2. N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law §§ 700-20 provides for proceedings to review an as-ca-ment
of real propert3. In New York City, such proceedings are governed by the N.Y.C. Charter
§§ 163-66, and the N.Y.C. Adm. Code § 166-1.0.
3. See N.Y.C. Adm. Code § 173-1.0 (penalty of interest); N.Y.C. Charter § 172 (tax
lien); N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law §§ 1110-16 (foreclosure of tax lien). The United
States Court of Claims summarized the situation thus: "The institution or pendency of
litigation for the correction of an assessment did not postpone the dates the bills for the
real estate taxes became due and payable. Failure to pay the tax bills when due cubjected
the property involved to a tax len which had the effect of a judgment lien which could
have been foreclosed and the property sold. In addition, a pe-alty of interest at 7 prcent
per annum was incurred. There was no provision in the New York law for suspending or
removing the tax lien, whether by injunction, bond or otherv.ise, other than by payment
of the taxes thereon, as billed. Thus an aggrieved property owner had to first pay the real
estate taxes and then seek to rectify the error by the exclusive remedy or run the rislk, in
addition to incurring 7 percent interest, of having the tax lien foreclosed and the property
sold." Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States, 133 Ct. Cl. 376, 135 F. Supp. 13, I32
(1955).
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were concluded in 1951 by a settlement which fixed the tax at a somewhat
lower figure than the amount theretofore paid. The difference, an amount less
than the total amount which had been contested, was refunded. The taxpayer
brought the present suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York 4 to recover the alleged overpayment of federal income
taxes for 1951. The taxpayer contended that it should be permitted to deduct,
in 1951, that part of the disputed local property taxes which was determined
to be properly assessed, and argued that it was required to deduct in the years
of payment only that portion of the property taxes which were uncontested.
The Government contended that the taxpayer was required to deduct the
entire amount of the local property taxes in the year of payment, and that it
was required to include in its gross income for 1951 the partial refund which
it received under the settlement reached in that year. The district court granted
the Government's motion for summary judgment. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, Judge Clark dissenting, and held that
"when the exact nature of the payment is not immediately ascertainable
because it depends on some future event, such as the outcome of litigation, its
treatment for income tax purposes must await that event." Consolidated Edison
Co. v. United States, 279 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 364 U.S. 890
(1960) (No. 357, 1960 Term).
When a taxpayer maintains its books according to the accrual method of
accounting, a deduction for federal income tax purposes is generally allowed
in the year in which all events occur to fix the amount of the expense and
determine the liability.5 This "all events" rule was established in United States
v. Anderson.6 Although a taxpayer paid an expense item in 1917, the Court
held that the expense properly accrued in 1916 and was deductible only in
that year.7 The year in which a tax expense may be taken as a deduction is
4. Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
In addition to the United States Tax Court, the other courts of original jurisdiction
are the United States district courts and the United States Court of Claims. See generally
10 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation §§ 58A.19, 58A.24 (Zimet rev. 1958). Suits In tile
latter two courts are known as refund suits, since the taxpayer is seeking a refund of an
amount he has already paid.
5. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(c), 53 Stat. 12 (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 164(a)), provides for deductions from gross income of taxes paid or accrued within the
taxable year. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 41, 53 Stat. 24 (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§§ 441, 446), provides that net income shall be computed upon the basis of the taxpayer's
annual accounting period and in accordance with the method of accounting regularly
employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 42, 53
Stat. 24 (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 451), provides that the amount of all items of
gross income shall be included in the gross income for the taxable year in which received
by the taxpayer, unless, under methods of accounting permitted under § 41, any such
amounts are to be properly accounted for as of a different period. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch.
1, § 48, 53 Stat. 26 (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7701(a)(25)), provides that the
terms "paid or incurred" and "paid or accrued" shall be construed according to the
method of accounting upon the basis of which the net income is computed.
6. 269 U.S. 422 (1926).
7. Id. at 442.
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determined not merely by the fact of assessment or payment; it depends on
whether the amount of the tax expense is fixed and whether the liability of the
taxpayer to pay is definite.8
Frequently a tax expense is assessed for a particular year, but the taxpayer,
denying liability, refuses to pay and begins an action in which he hopes to
avoid the expense through administrative or court decision in his favor. When
may this contested tax expense be taken as a deduction on the federal income
tax return? 9 The Supreme Court in Security Flour Mfills Co. v. Commzssioncr'°
stated:
It is settled by many decisions that a taxpayer may not accrue an expense the amount
of which is unsettled or the liability for which is contingent, and this principle is
fully applicable to a tax, liability for which the taxpayer denies, and payment whereof
he is contesting."'
This principle was applied to a situation where the taxpayer contested liability
for an Agricultural Adjustment Act tax.12 The Court held that the tax could
not be deducted as an accrued liability. In dictum, it said:
"It is the essence of any system of taxation that it should produce revenue ascer-
tainable, and payable to the government, at regular intervals. Only by such a system
is it practicable to produce a regular flow of income and apply methods of accounting
assessment, and collection capable of practical operation." [citing Burnet v. Sarford
& Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 365 (1931).]
This legal principle has often been stated and applied. The uniform result has
been denial both to Government and to taxpayer of the privilege of allocating income
or outgo to a year other than the year of actual receipt or payment, or, applying the
S. These subsidiary questions were decided in Continental Tie & Lumber Co. v. United
States, 286 U.S. 290, 297-93 (1932) (fixing the amount of the tax), and Luce5 v.
American Code Co., 2S0 US. 445 (1930) (determination of the liability).
9. "For cash basis taxpayers life is . . . simple. . . . nerally Epaking, they have
income when they receive cash or what the courts have considercd the 1cquivalnt of
cash' . . . and they have deductions when they actually pay their epenses. . . . The
accrual method is supposedly more sophisticated. The timing of income and deductons
does not turn on the accident of receipt or payment of money. InAtead, income is
supposedly based on the right to payment and deductions on the duty to pay:'
Lyon, Federal Income Taxation, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 697, 716 (190).
10. 321 U.S. 281 (1944). When a taxpayer does not pay an azerted liability and brings
suit contesting it, the deductions can be taken only in the year in which the contest is
finally settled. Dixie Pine Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 320 US. 516 (1944). The taxpayer
had accrued on its books and deducted on its federal income tax return the full amount of
Mississippi state gasoline taxes which had been as-esscd for its use of a Eolvcnt during
1936. It did not pay the tax and was contesting its validity under state law. The Supreme
Court of Mississippi ultimately held that the taxpayer was not liable for the tax. Dyer v.
Dixie Pine Prods. Co., 186 Miss. 567, 191 So. 429 (1939). The taxpayer then included in
its 1938 income the gasoline tax amount which had been deducted for 1937. The
Commissioner disallowed the 1937 deduction and was upheld by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
11. 321 US. at 284.
12. Ch. 25, 4S Stat. 31 (1933). The imposition of this tax .as declared unconstitutional
in United States v. Butler, 297 US. 1 (1936).
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accrual basis, the year in which the right to receive, or the obligation to pay, has
become final and definite in amount.13
In two companion cases' 4 decided in 1955, the Supreme Court adhered to
the principle that an accrual basis taxpayer must take deductions in the year of
accrual, not in the year of payment.
Two principles may be derived from this line of Supreme Court decisions:
(1) When payment of an expense is made after "all events" have occurred to
fix liability and determine amount, the fact of payment is a neutral circum-
stance in determining the time a deduction must be taken, and (2) when
payment is not made and liability is contested, the deduction must await the
final determination of liability and amount.
When payment is made and the taxpayer contests his liability by suing for a
refund, neither principle is in point. Yet, in practice, there are situations where
the only way to contest a local tax is to pay the amount required and then
sue for a refund. 15 The courts are in disagreement as to whether the deduction
must be taken in the year of payment or in the year the liability is determined.
The Court of Claims has held that the amount paid must be deducted in the
year in which payment was made,' 6 stating that "accrual, from the debtor's
standpoint, precedes payment, and does not survive it."' 7 This proposition was
followed in Consolidated Edison v. United States,'8 a case which, aside from
the tax years involved, was tried on a stipulation of facts identical to those in
the instant case. While the former action was pending in the Court of Claims,
Consolidated Edison brought the present suit for refund. The district court
adopted the position taken by the Court of Claims. The court of appeals
reversed' 9 and held that an accrual basis taxpayer cannot deduct a contested
tax which has been paid until the liability is settled.20
The Second Circuit view is logically correct. 21 By its very nature accrual
accounting endeavors to match expenses with the time period in which they are
actually incurred.2 The date of payment is not relevant in determining how an
13. 321 U.S. at 286-87.
14. United States v. Olympic Radio & Television, Inc., 349 U.S. 232 (1955); Lewyt
Corp. v. Commissioner, 349 U.S. 237 (1955). Both cases involved the same point-whether
a taxpayer on the accrual basis can, in computing its net operating loss for one year,
deduct the amount of excess profits taxes which were paid in that year but had accrued in
an earlier year.
15. See note 3 supra.
16. Chestnut Securities Co. v. United States, 104 Ct. Cl. 489, 62 F. Supp. 574 (1945).
17. Id. at 495, 62 F. Supp. at 576.
18. This prior refund suit covered the years 1938-1940. 133 Ct. Cl. 376, 135 F. Supp.
881 (1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 909 (1956), motion for rehearing denied, 364 U.S. 898
(1960).
19. Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States, 279 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1960).
20. A more striking conflict between courts could hardly be imagined. The appeal from
each is to the United States Supreme Court. The parties, statement of facts and legal issues
are the same. The decisions are contrary.
21. Note, 1960 U. Ill. L. F. 461.
22. See Finney, General Accounting 152 (1941).
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expense will be allocated. This is the prevailing accounting view now adopted
by the court. It is the ultimate extension of the "all events" rule to every
contested expense, paid or unpaid.
The same or allied reasoning was expressed in United States v. Texas At.
Ry.,23 wherein the Fifth Circuit held that the taxpayer could not deduct the
amount of a judgment before litigation ended, although it had deposited in
escrow an amount equal to that judgment. An example given in the Federal
Tax Regulations2 4 lends weight to "determination of liability" as the fact which
establishes the time for a deduction. And Judge Jones, in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States,25 concluded that "the rule to be uniform should follow the
straight rule laid down in Dixie Pine and Security Flour that all events do not
occur within the taxable year that fix the amount and the fact of tax liability
until litigation is ended."12 G
Since 1954, there has been a trend to conform "the rules of tax accounting
to commercial practice." 27 The trend has been limited to prepaid income
cases,28 but recognition that under certain circumstances prepaid income may
be deferred and taxed as it is earned rather than as it is received, is but
another way of saying that the fact of payment does not determine the time
of accrual.
Admitting that this view is logically correct, and that it is supported by a
trend in analogous cases, inquiry should then be focused on the desirability of
the principle. A basic policy question is then involved: Should the system of
tax accounting rules and commercial accounting rules be uniform and identical?
The view proposed by the instant court is another step in this direction.
Simplicity and uniformity are certainly desirable goals in this area, but the
advisability of introducing purely technical accounting refinements into the
federal tax system under the aegis of following a current trend toward uniform
accounting practice is questionable. Before a rule is adopted by the courts,
serious consideration should be given to the effect it may have on the business
community, the taxpayers to be affected. This seems to have been overlooked
in the analysis made by both courts.
What is the effect of applying each rule to a series of tax years? As the
23. 263 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1959).
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(2) (1959). If a taxpayer conceded part of a daim, the
admitted liability accrues while the contested amount is held in abeyance until the contest
is settled. Thus: A renders services to B and claims $10,CM0. B admits liability for $SC'.O
but contests the remainder. B can accrue $5,G00 as an expense in the year the fervices are
rendered.
25. 56-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f 10051, 51 Am. Fed. Tax R. 16SS (NJ). Ohio 1956).
26. Id. at 11 1C051, 51 Am. Fed. Tax R. at 1690.
27. See Behren, Prepaid Income-Accounting Concepts and the Tax Law, 15 Tax L.
Rev. 343, 366 (1960), and cases cited therein.
28. For a comprehensive review of tax law as applied to prepaid incomc, cza Bchren,
supra note 27; Lyon, supra note 9; Shapiro, Tax Accounting for Prcpaid Income and
Reserves for Future Expenses, in House Comm. on Ways & Means, in 2 Complendium of
Papers on Broadening the Tax Base, S6th Cong., 1st Sezs. 1133 (Comm. Print 1959).
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example2 9 indicates, the net effect both to government and to taxpayer is
the same. It may be argued that changing tax rates, recession or special tax
impositions may alter the net result. But the equal probability that such
changes woud be favorable or unfavorable to the taxpayer serves to answer
such criticism. The real difference is in the apportionment between the early
and later year, i.e., how tax payments to the federal government would be
affected in the year the local tax was first assessed, and in the year the litigation
was finally settled.
In the early year the taxpayer has parted with cash in order to pay the
local tax assessment. Under the Court of Claims rule, the taxpayer is allowed
a federal deduction of this amount, thereby mitigating the effect of the local
tax payment. In the later year, if successful in his suit for a refund, the
taxpayer has a local tax rebate to offset the federal tax payment necessitated
by treating the refunded amount as income.
Under the Second Circuit rule, the taxpayer would also pay the local tax
assessment in the early year, but a deduction of this amount is not to be
allowed on the federal tax return. The result is a higher federal tax payment
in the very year that the cash flow was already adversely affected by the local
tax payment. In the later year, if successful in his suit for a refund, the tax-
payer has a local tax rebate and the benefit of a federal deduction for any
proper local assessment. The rule brings about lush and lean years.30
29. Assume the following facts: a) A local tax assessment of $1,000 is paid under
protest in 1960; b) Income for federal tax purposes is $50,000 in 1960 and $50,000 In
1961; c) The federal tax rate is 50% for both years; d) The taxpayer contests the local
tax assessment and wins a reduction of $300 in 1961.
The Court of Claims position is that the taxpayer must take a deduction of the total
amount in the year of payment, and take the refund as income in the year the litigation is
settled. In 1960, taxpayer deducts $1,000 from his income of $50,000 and shows $49,000 as
taxable at 50%. His federal tax is $24,500 in the first year. In 1961, the taxpayer adds the
$300 refunded to his $50,000 income and shows $50,300 as taxable at 50%. His federal tax
is $25,150 for the second year. The total tax paid during both years is $49,650.
The Second Circuit holds that the taxpayer may not deduct the local tax during the year
of payment. He must wait until the contest is determined. Then, the amount of the final
assessment becomes a deduction, and the refunded amount is not income, but rather
represents a return of an asset which was on deposit. In 1960, the taxpayer does not deduct
$1,000 from his income, but shows $50,000 as taxable at 50%. His federal tax is $25,000
for the first year. In 1961, the taxpayer deducts the $700 as properly assessed, and shows
$49,300 as taxable at 50%. His federal tax is $24,650 for the second year. The total tax
paid during both years is $49,650.
30. Effect on Cash Flow:
Applying the Rule of the Court of Claims--
1960 1961
Cash before local assessment $50,000 $50,000
Payment/Credit 1,000 300
Leaving 49,000 50,300
Less federal tax payment 24,500 25,150
Net remaining 24,500 25,150
The problem of meeting tax payments and adjusting cash flow is serious to
many businesses. The practical effect of this decision should have been considered
before formulating a new and basic tax rule.
Fairly considered, the Court of Claims rule3 ' results in a more balanced
cash flow by matching payment and rebate against one another. It is unwise to
adhere to an old rule simply because it is old, but it is at least worthy of
mention that few of the taxpayers affected by the rule have thus far sought
to contest its application.
The "all events" rule has been correctly applied to limit deductions on the
federal tax return where the taxpayer has not paid an expense item and is
contesting his liability. The rule has been extended to limit deduction in cases
where payment of an expense has been made under circumstances which
indicate that the payment was voluntary or conditional pending the determina-
tion of liability.32
The Second Circuit, however, has gone beyond these criteria and extended the
rule to all cases of contested liability, including those which involve uncon-
ditional payment of the controverted item. A disallowance of the federal tax
deduction might well dissuade a business man from initiating such suits alto-
gether. The extension of this rule can serve no more useful purpose than to
penalize a taxpayer for exercising his right to contest a local asses-ment or tax
liability.
Applying the Rule of the Second Circuit- 1960 1961
Cash before local assessment q5O,OO0 0'CGo
Payment/Credit 1,000 0
Leaing 49,000 E0,3C.)
Less federal tax payment 25,000 24,650
Net remaining 24,000 253,00
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 11, provides current corporate tax rates.
31. Chestnut Securities Co. v. United States, 104 Ct. CI. 4S9, 495, 62 F. Supp. 574, S76
(1945).
32. United States v. Texas Al. Ry., 263 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1959).
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